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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
PERSONALITY AND EMOTION FOR VIRTUAL CHARACTERS IN
STRONG-STORY NARRATIVE PLANNING
Interactive virtual worlds provide an immersive and effective environment for train-
ing, education, and entertainment purposes. Virtual characters are an essential part
of every interactive narrative. The interaction of rich virtual characters can produce
interesting narratives and enhance user experience in virtual environments. I propose
models of personality and emotion that are highly domain independent and integrate
those models into multi-agent strong-story narrative planning systems. I demonstrate
the value of the strong-story properties of the model by generating story conflicts in-
telligently. My models of emotion and personality enable the narrative generation
system to create more opportunities for players to resolve conflicts using certain be-
havior types. In doing so, the author can encourage the player to adopt and exhibit
those behaviors. I conduct multiple human subject and case studies to evaluate these
models and show that they enable generating a larger number of stories and character
behavior that is preferred and more believable to a human audience.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Storytelling has always been prevalent in human culture and various types of media,
such as novels, television, and theater. Humans have an inherent ability to describe
their experiences in narrative form. This narrative intelligence is central to the cogni-
tive processes employed to tell stories, explain stories, or form expectations regarding
a series of events.
Computational systems that reason about narrative intelligence simulate such cog-
nitive processes through different models and algorithms. Although storytelling comes
naturally to humans, authoring and creating systems with narrative intelligence poses
a significant challenge. This becomes more challenging when the user becomes in-
volved in the story rather than being a mere observer as in watching a movie.
Interactive storytelling or interactive narratives allow users to be a part of a fictional
world and influence a dramatic story-line through actions by assuming the role of
a character and interacting with non-player characters (NPCs) [Riedl and Bulitko,
2013]. The applications of interactive narratives can be found in education ([Dede;
Roussou; Rowe et al., 1995; 2004; 2011]), training ([Thomas and Young; Zook et al.;
Garcia et al., 2010; 2012; 2019]), therapy ([Aylett et al.; Dumas et al.; Yannakakis
et al., 2007; 2010; 2010]), and entertainment ([Zyda and Sheehan; Levine; Shirvani
and Ware, 1997; 2014; 2020]).
Interactive narratives immerse users in a virtual world where they can interact with
the world and its characters and feel as an integral part of an unfolding story [Riedl
and Bulitko, 2013]. Whether a story is interactive or not, characters are its key com-
ponent and crucial to its coherence. If we consider the user as one of the characters,
character actions and interactions form a major portion of a story. Therefore, I focus
mainly on character behavior with the goal of providing the user with an immersive
and effective experience.
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There are many qualities that make story characters behave in a more consistent
and believable manner. The BDI model [Rao et al., 1995] names Beliefs, Intentions,
and Desires as three of the core qualities. Characters must have their own individual
beliefs about the world they live in, have their own individual goals to achieve, and
form intentions to pursue those goals. Other believability models, including those
proposed by Loyall (1997), Mateas (1999), and many others, consider personality
and emotion as another two important qualities for believable characters. By equip-
ping virtual characters with personality and emotion, we can present a more coherent
story with more believable characters whose actions (and how those actions change
the world), do not violate the audience’s expectations and thus, provide an uninter-
rupted immersive experience [Young et al., 2013]. In this document, I will build on
previous automatic storytelling systems that model agents with goals and beliefs and
incorporate emotion and personality into those systems.
1.1 Strong-Story Storytelling
I model personality and emotion in strong-story storytelling. In this section, I will
introduce the concept and later, in Chapter 2, provide more details and examples.
Strong-story systems are a class of automatic story generation systems that use
a centralized intelligent unit, often referred to as an experience manager [Riedl and
Bulitko, 2013], to coordinate the actions of all characters. Strong story is considered
an extreme, on the opposite side of the spectrum, from strong autonomy. Storytelling
systems often strike a middle ground between strong story and strong autonomy or
choose to be closer to end of the spectrum than the other.
Strong autonomy puts their characters first and gives them a high degree of freedom
and independence from the experience manager (if there exists one at all). Strong-
autonomy systems are often used for entertainment and simulations whose authors
have no specific goals but to provide an entertaining and engaging experience. In
strong autonomy, each character is an independent intelligent agent that is situated
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in the world, and the story emerges organically as the characters interact with the
world, the player, or other characters. The author can constrain the decision making
of each character, but they generally cannot control how they behave in specific
situations (or at least without hand-authoring those situations).
Strong-story systems explore the space of all possible stories and choose the best
one that matches some constraints. More specifically, the experience manager can
foresee and anticipate all events and character interactions to plan ahead the storylines
that best fit those constraints. We can even assume that the experience manager is
the only intelligent agent as it decides about the actions and behaviors of all story
characters, such that they appear to be autonomous and intelligent. Strong story
provides authors with more control over the player experience; but it often comes at
a high computational cost as story spaces tend to be immense.
Strong-story systems are most suitable for authors who want their players to have
a particular type of experience and achieve a certain set of goals in the narrative.
For training and educational simulations, they enable authors to teach their players
specific lessons, provide them with important information, or help them acquire cer-
tain skills. For entertainment, they can personalize the narrative to various types of
players or tailor story events to increase player engagement and enjoyment.
Riedl et al. consider narrative planners as strong story systems because they rely on
an experience manager to generate a story that satisfies the author goals and then try
to explain the actions of non-player characters [Riedl and Bulitko, 2013]. I build on
previous multi-agent narrative planners that model agents with their individual goals
and beliefs [Riedl and Young; Teutenberg and Porteous; Ware and Young; Teutenberg
and Porteous; Shirvani et al., 2004; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2017]. These planners lack of
a model of personality and emotion that could make their characters behave more
consistently and human-like. To propose a model of personality and emotion, I focus
on multi-agent strong-story narrative planning.
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1.2 Intelligent Conflict Generation
By using a strong-story model, I enable experience managers to explore the space
of all possible stories, reason about different types of stories, and intelligently choose
ones that best fit the system’s goals. In this document, I will support this idea in
practice by using emotion, personality, and the ability of strong-story systems to
intelligently create player choices, specifically for conflict resolution.
Many narratologists agree that conflict is an essential part of every story [Brooks
and Warren; Abbott; Field, 1979; 2020; 2006]. A conflict can provoke anxiety and
suspense, making a character pause to carefully consider their options. A conflict
occurs when a character, such as the player, is faced with a choice which could have
negative outcomes for them.
In an interactive context, a strong-story narrative planner can search the space of
all possible stories and
1. Find all player choices that represent a conflict: the planner can find all charac-
ter plans and how those plans could threaten to thwart each other. For instance,
the planner can identify that the player wants to cross a forest, a bandit living
in the forest, and the conflict of the player getting robbed by the bandit.
By using an emotion model and a player model, the planner can assume the
player’s goals and how the player fears failing their goals. This fear calls for
a player choice that could either end up in the player’s fears becoming true or
feeling relieved instead.
2. Reason about player expectations of the outcomes of that choice by exploring
the possible worlds that could unfold as a result: after identifying the conflict
of the player getting robbed, the planner finds player plans that could resolve
the conflict. For instance, the player could do nothing, flee, attack, or talk to
the bandit. Based on the player’s beliefs about the world state, the planner can
reason about their expectations: if they do nothing, the bandit will rob them;
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if they flee the bandit will follow them, and so on. Using a personality model,
the planner can distinguish between these different options, predict what option
the player chooses, or determine what type of behavior is encouraged by each
option. For instance, attacking the bandit is not agreeable or talking to the
bandit is extroverted.
3. Use this information to plan a narrative and coordinate all virtual characters: af-
ter the planner has reasoned about player options and expectations, the planner
can coordinate the actions of every other character. For instance, the planner
may decide that there are no good options to resolve a conflict—here, good is a
measure that is often provided by the system’s author. For instance, the plan-
ner determines that the player believes the only way to avoid getting robbed is
to attack the bandit. In that case, the planner never puts the bandit on the
player’s path to avoid forcing the player to resort to violence.
Using this process, I enable the narrative system to intelligently generate conflicts
based on the author’s goals. For instance, in training and education, using this
model, the author can encourage the player to pursue certain goals and adopt certain
personality traits. In entertainment, the author can elicit the player’s personality and
personalize the narrative for various types of players.
In Chapter 4, I will describe the process of conflict generation in more detail, and
in Chapter 5, I will present the experiments used to evaluate this model.
1.3 Evaluation
I hypothesize that, using my models of personality and emotion for strong-story
narrative planning, (1) human readers find the generated character behavior to be
more believable and consistent, and (2) we can create story conflicts intelligently by
distinguishing between different conflicts and reasoning about their usefulness.
I conducted several experiments. To evaluate how my models of emotion and
personality contribute to character believability, the stories generated by those models
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must be presented to a human audience. Without a human audience, it is near
impossible to objectively determine that a system improves character believability
on its own merit and in comparison to others. Using the crowd sourcing platform,
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, I implemented several (interactive) stories using Twine1
and recruited participants to play those stories and answer questions about them.
A summary of my findings are as follows. I will provide detailed descriptions of the
experiments and their results in Chapter 6.
• Participants significantly agreed that stories generated by my models of person-
ality and emotion are more believable than those generated by previous systems
(with no emotion or personality).
• Participants were able to perceive the personality traits of the story characters
and stated that those characters act in a more consistent way than those without
a personality.
• My model accurately simulates what a character should feel at different parts
of the story according to the expectations of the participants.
• Participants showed more empathy towards characters that expressed emotions
than those that did not.
These results show that my models of emotion and personality accurately simulate
character behavior in line with the expectations of a human audience, and using
these models, a human audience finds the generated behavior more consistent and
believable.
To investigate the effectiveness of my models for intelligent conflict generation, I
implemented two interactive narratives from two story domains, one in an entertain-
ment context and one in a training simulation context. I simulated a player agent
1https://twinery.org/
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who played through that narratives. A summary of my findings are as follows. I will
provide detailed descriptions of the experiments and their results in Chapter 6.
• On average, the player experienced a smaller number of conflicts when the
system generated conflicts intelligently, as it did not allow conflicts that could
not be resolved by the intended behavior.
• On average, out of all instances of a player conflict in the two story domains,
28.08% and 30.52% of the conflicts could not be resolved using the author’s
intended behavior when the system did not generate conflicts intelligently.
• On average, out of all instances of a player conflict in the two story domains, the
player chose to resolve a conflict using the author’s intended behavior 56.31%
and 67.35% of the time when the system generated conflicts intelligently, and
46.48% and 35.14% of the time when it did not.
These results show that my model reduces the number of generated conflicts by
removing those that cannot be resolved by the author’s intended behaviors. Moreover,
by providing a choice to resolve a conflict using the author’s intended behaviors, a
player is more likely to exhibit those types of behaviors. In short, the proposed model
enables us to distinguish which conflicts are useful in the context of a story.
1.4 Outline
The rest of this document is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I will discuss the
related work in generating believable behavior and computational models of emotion
and personality. More specifically, I will show what the general consensus is on
qualities that make characters believable and how previous storytelling systems have
modeled certain key qualities.
In Chapter 3, I will present the fundamental concepts of narrative planning and
introduce the models of personality, i.e. the Five Factor Model (FFM) [Goldberg,
1992], and emotion, i.e. OCC [Ortony et al., 1990], in psychology that inspired my
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models. In Chapter 4, I will provide more formal definitions of narrative planning
concepts used by my models, and discuss the adaptation of FFM and OCC into
computational models of personality and emotion. I will also explain in detail how
the incorporation of those models into strong-story state-space narrative planning
changes the previous definitions, allows generating more stories, and can be used for
intelligent conflict generation in interactive contexts.
Chapter 5 focuses on the investigation and evaluation of the proposed models via
multiple experiments. Using several human-subject studies, I will first show how the
stories generated by my models improve a human audience’s perceived believability
of the story characters. Next, I will evaluate the use of personality and emotion in
conflict generation by generating multiple interactive narratives and having a simu-
lation agent play through them. Finally, Chapter 6 will present the conclusions and
future work.
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CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK
2.1 Believable Characters
The concept of believability has long been studied in animation, theater, and other
media. In their work on Walt Disney animation, Thomas and Johnston describe how
Disney animations attempt to make the audience believe in their characters, to laugh,
and to cry with those characters’ adventures and misfortunes [Johnston and Thomas,
1981]. They elaborate on the notion of the illusion of life as a special ingredient
in their animated characters that make them appear to think and act of their own
volition.
According to Bates et al., believability is the illusion of life that permits suspension
of disbelief where the audience accepts the story even though what they perceive
contradicts with what they think is real [Bates et al., 1992]. Suspension of disbelief
does not mean the audience believes everything they perceive but that they won’t
reject the story for the sake of enjoyment [Lee and Heeter, 2015].
In fact, suspension of disbelief is a common ground shared by many definitions
of believable characters. Mateas defines a believable character as one who seems
life-like, whose actions make sense, and allows for suspension of disbelief [Mateas,
1999]. Loyall considers a character believable when it allows suspension of disbelief
and provides a convincing portrayal of personality [Loyall, 1997].
2.1.1 Believable Characters vs. Realistic Characters
Believable characters do not necessarily have to be realistic [Loyall, 1997] but they
must be real in the context of their environment [Mateas, 1999]. As was mentioned,
believable characters enable the audience to willingly suspend their disbelief even if
those characters are fictional and unrealistic.
Clear examples of the difference between realism and believability can be found
in Disney animations. In fact, they have shown that believability does not require
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human form [Loyall, 1997]. They animated their characters to only resemble what
that type of animal looks like, while exhibiting human-like expressions and reactions.
2.1.2 Believable Characters vs. Believable Agents
Computer Scientists and Artificial Intelligence researchers have borrowed the prac-
tices of early animators to create believable agents. In other words, believable agents
are personality-rich autonomous agents with properties of believable characters [Loy-
all, 1997]. As with the illusion of life in believable characters, believable agents may
give the illusion of being controlled by a human [Tencé et al., 2010].
In this document, I will use believable characters and agents interchangeably. How-
ever, one of their major differences is that believable agents are interactive or more
specifically, the interactions with their audience are bidirectional which makes their
creation even more difficult [Loyall, 1997].
2.1.3 Believability vs. Intelligence
As AI researchers searched for essential qualities to create the illusion of life, they
gravitated more towards reasoning, problem-solving, and other qualities associated
with intelligence. Bates attributes this trend to the fact that intelligence is a quality
of a scientist and thus, valued by the AI and computer science community [Bates
et al., 1992].
However, the central requirement for believable agents is not intelligence [Loyall,
1997], but rather personality [Loyall; Mateas, 1997; 1999] and emotions [Bates et al.;
Ortony, 1992; 2002]. In fact, one could say that flaws and dysfunctionalities of an
agent might add to their believability [Lisetti and Hudlicka, 2015] and a general
competence for routine physical activities and social interactions is enough to create
believable agents [Loyall, 1997].
Table 2.1 presents a comparison between AI research focused on intelligent and
believable agents [Mateas, 1999]. Many definitions of believability include personality
as one of the key qualities. In contrast to intelligent agents motivated by optimally
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Table 2.1: A Comparison of Intelligent and Believable Agents




Evaluation Audience Perception Objective Measurement
solving complex problems and tasks, a believable character could be smart or stupid
depending on its personality.
Each believable character has its own specific personality as intended by the au-
thor, whereas intelligent agents follow a general set of principles to solve a universal
problem. A fictional character like Sherlock Holmes is not a solution to a general
problem but plays a specific role in the context of its story.
A believable character is an artistic abstraction of reality [Mateas, 1999]. They
are designed to exist in virtual worlds however they are imagined by the artist or the
author. In contrast, Intelligent agents function in settings that best simulate, perhaps
constrained, real world scenarios. For instance, face recognition algorithms aim to
identify or verify a person in the real world from a digital image or video frame.
Finally, the success of an intelligent agent is objectively measured by its accuracy,
efficiency, the number of problems it can solve, and so on. This cannot be applied
to assess believable agents without involving an audience. For believable agents, an
audience is required to evaluate them based on their perception of the agents, i.e.
whether the audience finds those agents believable and to what extent.
2.1.4 Qualities of Believable Characters
There are many qualities that make characters believable. There has been extensive
research on those qualities and there are several key ones that many researchers came
to agree on. Since these qualities are well established in the literature, I do not
further investigate their effect on character believability. Instead I attempt to extend
existing narrative systems equipped with some qualities to incorporate ones they lack,
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Table 2.2: Believability Qualities Present in Various Models
Quality\Present in model 1 2 3 4 5
Personality Y Y Y Y Y
Emotions Y Y Y Y Y
Change Y Y Y N Y
Illusion of Life (IoL) Y Y N N Y
IoL: Goals Y Y N Y Y
IoL: Social Context Y Y Y Y Y
IoL: Awareness and Responsiveness Y Y Y Y Y
IoL: Appearance and Capabilities Y Y Y Y Y
1. [Loyall, 1997]
2. [Mateas, 1999]
3. [Gomes et al., 2013]
4. [Lee and Heeter, 2015]
5. [Bogdanovych et al., 2016]
specifically personality and emotions. In this section, I focus on five believability
models to show the importance of the three major qualities of believable characters,
personality, emotions, and illusion of life. Table 2.2 presents these qualities and the
models that consider them important.
Personality
“A personality trait is an enduring personal characteristic that reveals itself in a
particular pattern of behavior in different situations” [Poznanski and Thagard, 2005].
Personality is the unique and consistent pattern of traits over situation and time [Guil-
ford; Pervin and John, 1959; 1999]. Such unique way of doing things makes characters
more interesting [Mateas, 1999]. For virtual characters, personality can contribute to
coherency, consistency, and predictability of their reactions and responses [Ortony,
2002]. As Table 2.2 shows, many researchers agree that having characters with no-
ticeable individual personalities is one of the qualities that improve believability.
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Emotions
As shown in Table 2.2 and by many other researchers, the ability to process and
express emotions is another quality of believable agents [Hayes-Roth and Doyle; Bates
et al.; Reilly and Bates; Romano and Wong, 1998; 1992; 1995; 2004]. According to
Loyall, a character should not only appear to think, but also must show emotions of
their own [Loyall, 1997]. In case of virtual characters, artificial emotions are labels
for states that may not exactly replicate human feelings, but are intended to initiate
behavior that we would expect from someone in that state [Picard, 1997].
Change
Change, specially in the protagonist, can contribute to believability if used in cer-
tain genres. A character’s behavior can change with experience [Gomes et al., 2013]
and in line with their personality [Loyall, 1997]. Bogdanovych et al. define change
as learning and describe it as the ability of agents to change their behavior to adapt
to the changes in their environment [Bogdanovych et al., 2016]. Samsonovich et al.
describe character arc as the evolution of a character and its goals in a story. By
their definition, a character’s beliefs, goals, and intentions are a function of time
[Samsonovich and Aha, 2015].
Illusion of Life
Loyall (1997) defines illusion of life as several requirements for believability as
described in the following sections. These requirements are mainly overlooked by
artists that create believable characters because they are taken for granted since, for
instance, in theater, the actor naturally brings them to life. However, this is not
something that believable virtual agents can afford to ignore.
All the mentioned models in Table 2.2 consider illusion of life as a quality of be-
lievable characters. More specifically, two models directly reference Loyall’s definition
[Lee and Heeter; Mateas, 2015; 1999]. Although the other two models define their own
qualities, their descriptions are very similar to the definition of certain requirements
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of illusion of life [Bogdanovych et al.; Gomes et al., 2016; 2013].
Illusion of Life: Goals
Illusion of life requires agents to appear to have goals and be able to pursue them
at the same time. In fact, goals, motivations, or desires are the main focus of many
narrative systems for generating believable behavior [Riedl and Young; Ware and
Young; Teutenberg and Porteous, 2010; 2011; 2013].
Riedl and Young address this requirement by proposing intentional agents [Riedl
and Young, 2004]. Intentional agents choose to take an action only if it serves at least
one of their goals, which are defined by an author.
Illusion of Life: Social Context
Characters must exist in a social context and understand the social conventions and
other aspects of the culture and world [Loyall, 1997]. Although the author accepts
responsibility for creating and describing the culture and conventions, characters may
choose to oblige or defy those conventions based on their personality. Since social
conventions are highly domain dependent, it is very challenging to provide a general
model for this aspect of social context.
In a social context, characters’ interactions must be consistent with their relation-
ships. Such interactions not only reveal [Loyall, 1997] but also change their relation-
ships [Mateas, 1999].
Illusion of Life: Awareness and Responsiveness
Believable agents are situated and reactive. According to Loyall (1997), agents not
only react to events in a timely manner, they also change what they are doing and
how they are doing it in response to their observations.
Another interpretation of these two qualities is mostly referred to as awareness.
Agents with awareness can perceive the world around them [Gomes et al., 2013] or
their context and state within the environment [Bogdanovych et al., 2016].
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Illusion of Life: Appearance and Capabilities
Agents must be broadly capable, e.g. talking, walking, emoting, and yet be resource
bounded. In other words, believable agents are not omniscient beings and even char-
acters such as Superman have certain physical and mental limitations. Belief Models
are an example of addressing this requirement by limiting what agents could know
about the world and other agents at any given time [Teutenberg and Porteous; Eger
and Martens; Shirvani et al., 2015; 2017; 2017].
Believable agents must also be able to integrate those capabilities. For instance,
an animated agent must smoothly transition between different actions instead of
resetting to idle or stopping before switching to the next animation.
The integration requirement is similar to appearance described by Lee and Heeter
[Lee and Heeter, 2015] and visual impact defined by Gomes et al. [Gomes et al.,
2013]. Appearance describes all visually perceivable qualities, such as gender, age,
height, as well as any details that attract the attention of the audience without their
distraction [Lester and Stone, 1997]. For instance, when an animated character is idle,
their chest moves to simulate breathing. Another example is verbal and non-verbal
behaviors described as liveness by Bogdanovych et al [Bogdanovych et al., 2016].
2.1.5 Defining a Scope in Adapting Believability Qualities
Personality and Emotion
Many stories can immensely benefit from characters with personalities and emo-
tions. My main focus is to propose a model of personality and emotion to equip
virtual agents with those qualities. In order to do so, I draw from widely-known and
already-validated models of personality and emotion is psychology. I do not investi-
gate the validity of those models; instead, I focus on operationalizing and adapting
them into computational models.
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Social Context
There have been narrative systems, e.g. [McCoy et al.; McCoy et al., 2012; 2014],
that focus on the social dynamics of characters in virtual worlds. Most of those
systems sacrifice domain independence for providing a model of social context, e.g.
through defining a set of rules to portray social conventions, social cues, etc. I believe
that a highly domain-independent model that incorporates social context in inter-
active narratives will ignore many important aspects of social dynamics. I will not
address social context in this document and only ensure that my proposed models
can be extended to include it in the future.
As a future direction, a model of character relationships can be incorporated into
my models of personality and emotion. For instance, making another character feel
positive or negative emotions can improve or deteriorate their relationship and char-
acters can consider their relationships when making choices based on their personality.
Change
Although there are no explicit constraints on story length, I assume interactive
stories generated by my model are not long enough to benefit from character changes.
As mentioned, change manifests itself over time and such quality may better suit
novels or plays, rather than a relatively short interactive narrative.
As a future direction, my model of personality can be extended to include change
by allowing character personalities to change as a direct consequence of the dynamic
between triggered emotions and character choices. For instance, if an agreeable char-
acter always makes benevolent choices but feels resentment and disappointment for
it, its personality may be shifted towards making less agreeable choices in the future.
Appearance
Appearance is determined by the presentation, e.g. how virtual characters are
embodied or animated in 2D or 3D rendered formats. In the context of this document,
I need to distinguish between appearance in my model of emotion and my model of
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Figure 2.1: Facial Expression and Gestures in Camelot
personality. For personality, I solely focus on its impacts on external behavior, more
specifically making character choices. For emotion, although, my focus is again on
its effects on character behavior, I also consider its manifestation as visual cues.
For example, in my text-based experiments, I express character emotions through
emotional keywords, such as “hopes to”, “fears”, “is disappointed by”. I have also
integrated my model of emotion into my 3D game engine, Camelot, developed over
the course of my Ph.D. Camelot is a modular customizable virtual environment that
can be fully controlled by an external, independent experience manager and acts as
its presentation layer [Shirvani and Ware, 2020]. Camelot provides a set of characters
with different body types, outfits, skin colors, and hair styles. An experience manager
can also choose to express the emotions of those characters via their facial expression
and idle animations, i.e. the character’s pose and gesture while standing still. Figure
2.1 presents some examples of these expressions. I will discuss more details of how
Camelot works and how I integrated my models in Camelot in Appendix 1.
Despite how I have integrated my model into these contexts to provide a visual-
ization for a human audience, the focus of my research is not on the physiological
manifestations of emotion and personality. I leave the detailed investigation of this
believability quality to the research focusing on physiological manifestations [Allbeck
and Badler; Kasap et al.; Arellano et al., 2002; 2009; 2008].
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Goals
Riedl and Young’s narrative planner addresses character goals and motivations
[Riedl and Young, 2004], and has been extensively researched and evaluated [Niehaus
and Young; Ware; Teutenberg and Porteous; Ware and Young, 2009; 2012; 2013;
2011]. I will continue to build on my previous work that extended their planner
to combine intentionality and belief, and explain how characters take actions they
believe will help them to achieve their goals [Shirvani et al., 2017].
Broadly Capable but Resource Limited
In narrative planning and specifically this research, agents are limited only to the
actions defined by the author. They are only as capable and limited as the author
allows them to be.
In my previous work, I proposed a model of belief that prevents agents from being
omniscient [Shirvani et al., 2017]. This limits their knowledge about the world and
other agents to their observations. Agents are aware of their own state, goals, and have
(possibly wrong) beliefs about the state of the world and other agents. They update
this information after they take actions themselves or observe actions performed by
others.
Being Situated and Reactive
Although I do not focus on situatedness and reactiveness, these two requirements
are implicitly addressed in how agents execute their plans in pursuit of their goals.
More specifically, when an agent observes an event in the world, they reevaluate their
current plan and may switch to a different one if a better plan is found.
2.2 Computational Models of Believable Characters
In this section, I will break down the previous work on systems that generate
believable behavior based on how they differ from my work:
• I incorporate personality and emotion into strong-story narrative planners.
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• My model of emotion is proactive in addition to being reactive.
• I consider the effect of personality on agent behavior without focusing only on
a specific subset of the five factors.
• I choose to prioritize domain independence over expressiveness. In other words,
I strive to minimize hand-authored information, even though they enable char-
acters to be more expressive in specific story domains.
• My models are applicable to multi-character narratives rather than single-agent
simulations such as virtual humans.
• I focus on communicating personality via higher-granularity actions rather than
natural language dialog or fine-grained physiological manifestations, such as
facial expressions and gestures.
• I consider the direct effect of personality on reasoning and external behavior
rather than using it to express the emotional state.
2.2.1 Strong Story vs. Strong Autonomy
One categorization of automatic story generation systems divides them into strong
story and strong-autonomy systems. In strong-story systems, characters only act with
the permission and guidance of a centralized reasoning process, often referred to as
the experience manager [Riedl and Bulitko, 2013].
An experience manager is an intelligent, omniscient, and disembodied agent that
drives the narrative forward by intervening in the fictional world through coordina-
tion of non-player characters (NPCs) and the environment [Riedl and Bulitko, 2013].
Based on the NPCs’ degree of autonomy from the experience manager, narrative gen-
eration systems fall on a spectrum from strong story to strong autonomy. Figure 2.2
presents some examples of previous narrative systems and how they are situated on
the strong story / strong autonomy spectrum.
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Strong Story Strong Autonomy









Figure 2.2: Examples of Strong Story vs. Strong Autonomy
1. [Dehn, 1981]
2. [Saretto and Young, 2001]
3. [Mateas, 1999]
4. [Nelson et al., 2006]
5. [Thue et al., 2008]
6. [Mateas and Stern, 2003]




In strong-autonomy systems, NPCs are unaware of the overarching narrative and
independently decide about their actions. Since the user’s experience is driven by
the uncoordinated actions of the NPCs and their own actions, the product of strong-
autonomy systems are often referred to as emergent narrative [Aylett, 1999]. An
extreme example of strong autonomy is TALE-SPIN, which generates simple stories
where human-like animals take action to achieve their goals [Meehan, 1977].
While the raw transpiring of a simulation can be interpreted as a narrative, it will
almost always lack story structure [Ryan, 2018]. There are ways however, to filter
events from the simulation to find interesting stories. For instance, a story sifter
sifts through raw simulated material to extract narrative artifacts with discernible
story structure [Ryan, 2018]. Nevertheless, in strong autonomy, we are limited to
the material offered by a simulation, and may often miss out on a, possibly more
interesting, subset of the space of all possible stories.
These characteristics make strong-autonomy systems suitable for simulation games
and exploratory learning environments where it is not always necessary to guide the
user’s experience towards a particular conclusion [Riedl and Bulitko, 2013]. The
author does not necessarily want to constrain the emergent narrative and only need
it to be interesting or engaging. For instance, Dwarf Fortress is a simulation game
that generates unique game worlds for the player to experience through procedural
content generation (PCG)1. The Sims is a sandbox game, in that it lacks any defined
goals. The player creates virtual people called Sims, places them in houses, and helps
direct their moods and satisfy their desires. World models a virtual world occupied
by procedurally generated virtual people that give rise to many emergent narratives.
In contrast, in strong story, the author almost always wants to steer the plot in a
specific direction and satisfy a specific set of goals. In order to do so, the experience
manager is given full control over the world and its NPCs to ensure achieving the
1Bay 12 Games: Dwarf Fortress, url=“https://www.bay12games.com/dwarves/”, Last Accessed:
6/28/2021
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author goals. The experience manager explores the space of all possible stories pri-
oritizing author constraints and ensuring that all NPCs are acting consistently with
their own character.
AUTHOR is on the opposite side of the spectrum as TALE-SPIN. AUTHOR simu-
lates an author’s mind rather than the world in which events take place [Dehn, 1981].
In doing so, characters may take actions that served the author’s goals, even though
they were out of character or contradicted with their goals.
The OZ drama manager controls a story at the level of plot points, a series of events
such as a scene [Mateas, 1999]. At a high level of granularity, the OZ drama manager
controls the narrative by altering the ordering and permutations of plot points. This
helps to achieve some level of plot coherence, but at the same time, limits the system’s
control over lower level granularities, such as individual character actions.
Mimesis uses planning to determine player actions that could threaten the world’s
storyline and how the storyline could be rewritten to accommodate those actions.
If the storyline cannot be effectively rewritten, the system finds a realistic way of
preventing that action [Saretto and Young, 2001].
Declarative Optimization-based Drama Management (DODM) abstracts possible
drama manager interventions as a set of DM actions. An optimization method chooses
DM actions to maximize story quality [Nelson et al., 2006] based on a function that
is provided by the author.
PaSSAGE2 automatically learns player preferences by observing their behavior and
utilizes those preferences to dynamically choose the events of an interactive narrative
[Thue et al., 2007]. More specifically, PaSSAGE annotates player actions to build
a model of their preferred styles of play, and then compares that model to author-
provided play-style annotations on possible story events to decide what should happen
next in the story.
2Player-Specific Stories via Automatically Generated Events
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By having the ability to reason and intervene in all user interactions, strong story
provides the author with the highest degree of leverage over their narrative structure.
This is particularly important, for instance, for educational and training purposes
that have a clear set of pedagogical goals. Strong-story systems are also not limited
to a subset of all possible stories, as strong autonomy often would be, since they
search through the space of all possible events to plan for the best narrative. This,
however, comes at a higher computational cost.
Many narrative systems attempt to strike a middle ground between strong story
and strong autonomy. Façade breaks down the narrative into high-level plot units. An
experience manager provides coherence by coordinating the plot units and characters
are autonomous to the extent that they can independently decide about realizing
each plot unit [Mateas and Stern, 2003]. In Automated Story Director, characters
behave autonomously until directed by an experience manager, at which point they
must seamlessly transition between their autonomous and required behaviors [Riedl
et al., 2005].
My proposed models are not purely strong story, as they ensure author goals are
satisfied and, at the same time, all character actions can be explained in terms of char-
acter goals. For brevity, I will refer to them as being strong story since they are on the
strong-story side of the spectrum. My models can use all the leverage of a strong-story
system, while still having the ability to reason about emotion and personality like a
strong-autonomy system. In other words, they bring the improved believability that
was previously mostly found in strong-autonomy systems into strong-story systems.
I build directly on previous strong-story narrative planners that equipped NPCs
with goals [Riedl and Young, 2004] and beliefs [Shirvani et al., 2017], and I improve
believability by giving those planners information on personality and emotion to work
with. In doing so, I also strengthen the strong story nature of the planner by giving
it more stories to explore. The more stories a planner can find, the more leverage it
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has to tell the story it needs.
Reactive vs. Proactive
The Appraisal Theory is one of the most widely known and validated models of
emotion [Lazarus and Lazarus, 1991]. An appraisal characterizes the relationship
between a person and their physical and social environment, referred to as the person-
environment relationship. “Changes to this relationship may induce new emotional
responses, resulting in a cycle of change in the person’s relation to the environment
[Marsella and Gratch, 2009].” EMA is one of the most notable computational models
of emotion that adopts the appraisal theory to generate believable agents [Marsella
and Gratch, 2009]. Figure 2.3 presents EMA’s architecture.
EMA builds and maintains a causal interpretation of world events in terms of be-
liefs, desires, and intentions. It then characterizes features of the causal interpretation
using appraisals, and maps each appraisal to individual instances of emotion. Emo-
tion instances are then aggreagated into a current emotional state and overall mood,
and a coping strategy is selected in response to the current emotional state. Coping
alters the person-environment relationship by motivating actions that change the en-
vironment (problem-focused coping) or by motivating changes to the interpretation
of this relationship (emotion-focused coping) [Marsella and Gratch, 2009].
There are two main differences between story generation systems using EMA and
my model of emotion. First, I choose to implement emotion types based on the OCC
theory of emotion [Ortony et al., 1990] rather than Lazarus’s appraisal theory. Sec-
ond, EMA is mainly reactive and my system is proactive as well as reactive. Through
the process described above, EMA determines the emotional state of an agent based
on appraisals and enables agents to react, mainly through coping mechanisms. With
proactive reasoning, a strong-story system can explore the space of all possible stories
and foresee many, if not all, sequences of events that will trigger different emotions
for different characters. Using this information, the system can plan ahead to cre-
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Figure 2.3: EMA’s Cognitive-Motivational-Emotive System
ate specific emotional situations for both the player and the NPCs. That is a type
of reasoning that EMA-based story generation systems do not attempt to do. Not
only does my model determine what triggers an emotion and how characters react
emotionally to events, but it also integrates reasoning about emotions into story gen-
eration. This proactive reasoning enables notable opportunities for story generation.
As I will show later, we can use proactive reasoning to foresee narrative paths that
cause positive and negative emotions in the player and use them to guide the player’s
experience.
Domain-Independent vs Expressive
To generate believable behavior, systems strike a middle ground between domain
independence and expressiveness. By providing more details about the domain, such
as the particular set of possible actions, we can model character actions on a finer level
of detail and enable them to be more expressive. The more domain specific a system
becomes, the more it relies on the system’s author to provide more information and,
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in turn, makes it more difficult to apply the system to other story domains. I choose
to prioritize high domain independence over expressiveness to provide a more general
tool for automatic story generation. The following are some examples of systems
that, in contrast, are more expressive but less domain independent.
The Playground is one of the extensions of the OZ project that used a rather
strong-autonomy approach to introduce a model of emotion and personality [Reilly;
Neal Reilly, 1996; 1997]. The authors model personality by considering the following
characteristics into each behavior: personality quirks, competence, emotions, rela-
tionships, attitudes, norms, roles, other goals of the agent, and robustness. These as-
pects are meant to provide artists (authors) with a concrete methodology for creating
personality-rich characters. This methodology, however, is highly domain specific.
Indeed, each of the decisions about how to incorporate personality must be made
separately for each character [Reilly, 1996]. It is also interesting how this work uses
emotion to model personality, rather than vice versa as seen in many other mod-
els, such as [Mehrabian; Lisetti; Gebhard, 1996; 2002; 2005]. Similar to EMA, the
methodology for maintaining the characters’ emotional states is reactive in nature.
Versu is a text-based interactive drama that tells an interactive story using hand-
authored episodes [Evans and Short, 2013]. Versu is strong autonomy as in each
character chooses his next action based on their own individual beliefs and desires, as
well as hand-authored social practices. Social practices describe a type of recurring
social situation, such as a greeting, and the actions that the agents can do in those
situations, e.g. how to greet or how to respond to a greeting. A practice provides
the agent with a set of suggested actions, but it is up to the agent himself to decide
which action to perform and the system takes no further measures to control these
decisions. Versu creates more expressive characters by using a domain-dependent
model of emotion and personality. For instance, to express personality through text,
instead of saying walk, characters with different personalities may swagger, walks
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ponderously, stride, or hobble. I consider Versu relatively highly domain dependent
as it needs a considerable amount of hand-authoring to provide the script for different
episodes.
FEARNOT! is another example of strong autonomy as it focuses on the emergent
narratives in an anti-bullying interactive drama [Aylett et al., 2007]. FEARNOT!
simulates scenarios in which children could explore what happens in bullying in a
non-threatening environment. The system determines a set of behaviors that the
character would perform as a coping mechanism in response to their emotional state
[Lazarus and Lazarus, 1991]. For instance, the bullying victim would cry not because
it was their goal to cry but because crying a reaction to a distressed emotional state.
As the events leading to the emotional state and the corresponding coping mechanisms
are hand-authored specific to the bullying scenario.
Riedl and Young enable authors to label operators with recommendations of which
personality traits characters should have to perform those actions [Riedl and Young,
2006]. These recommendations are not based on a specific personality model and
relegate the responsibility to the authors to define them as they please. The planner
uses a heuristic function that favors plans in which more recommendations are sat-
isfied. It is possible for the planner to ignore the recommendations when necessary,
which could be interpreted as characters acting “out of character”. I believe that one
advantage of my model of personality is that it does not ask authors to manually
label actions when authoring a new story domain.
SPOT trains a neural network on a hand-authored set of rules based on known
behavioral predispositions of the Big Five and common sense about human behaviors
[Poznanski and Thagard, 2005]. For instance, crying is the response of a highly
neurotic personality in a stressful situation and a bad mood.
Chang et al. develops a planning tool that enables an NPC agent to involve other
characters in its plan by changing their minds [Chang and Soo, 2009]. The authors
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define a set of personality traits as domain-dependent rules. For instance, greed
is represented by “one will pick up precious things at their location,” or vanity is
represented as “a woman will love a man who gives her something precious”.
Overlooking vs. Oversimplifying
Due to the complex nature of human personality and emotions, it is almost impos-
sible to propose computational models that adapt every personality trait and every
emotion type into a single system. Some computational models focus on certain parts
to implement them with as much detail as possible but, in turn, intentionally disre-
gard certain other parts. Other systems try to involve as many parts as possible but
it comes at the cost of simplifying each single part.
For instance, André et al. propose an affective agent-user interface based on FFM
that only models Extroversion and Agreeableness, to focus on social interactions, and
Neuroticism, to control the influence of character emotions [André et al., 1999]. Kasap
et al. apply the Neuroticism value to how they update agent relationships and emotion
decays [Kasap et al., 2009]. For more neurotic people, positive / negative emotions
disappear more quickly / slowly. Bahamon and Young define a mapping between
Agreeableness and planning actions as a highly domain independent knowledge base
[Bahamón and Young, 2017]. Elgarf considers Extroversion to investigate the process
of matching the personality of the user with the virtual character through body
language and its impacts of on the likability of the character and the information
recall of the story [Elgarf and Peters, 2019]. Paradeda et al. evaluate the effect of the
level of assertiveness in virtual agents on the participants’ decision-making process
and game experience [Paradeda et al., 2019].
In my work, I try to strike a middle ground in implementing my models of emotion
and personality. For personality, I choose to model all five factors but to simplify
them into a small number of planning features. For emotion, I choose to model 12




Researchers at Institute for Creative Technologies at the University of Southern
California have dedicated a long time of research on generating believable behavior
in form of virtual humans. Virtual humans are one of the widely researched applica-
tions of emotions and personality. “Virtual humans, software entities that look and
act like people, but live in simulated graphical environments and can freely inter-
act with humans immersed in the environment” [Gratch, 2002]. They are designed
to perceive, understand, and interact with real-world humans [Gratch et al., 2013].
Virtual humans range from the more complex cognitive agents to question response
agents.
Some notable systems that model virtual humans are MRE [Rickel et al., 2002],
SASO-ST [Swartout et al., 2006], or Virtual Patient [Kenny et al., 2007b]. In addi-
tion to a model of emotion, based on EMA, these systems also include higher level
components, such as speech recognition, natural language understanding, non-verbal
behavior, rhetorical text-to-speech output, gaze / gesture tracking, etc. These sys-
tems are another example of prioritizing expressiveness over domain independence. I
speculate that the main reason for this decision is that they provide specific simula-
tions for particular applications in the military and medical fields.
The research in virtual humans typically models a single agent that communicates
directly with the user. Virtual humans have been used as a patient interviewed by real
medical students [Johnsen et al., 2007], as a suspect in a bombing accident for tactical-
questioning [Kenny et al., 2007a], as a role-playing subordinate for interpersonal skills
training of naval officers [Hays et al., 2012], and as an interviewer in clinical interviews
[Lucas et al., 2014].
As shown by the examples above, virtual human applications typically have a
particular goal and simulate agents in a specific scenario. This leads to one major
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difficulty of virtual human simulations, the ability to design and author different
scenarios, since setting up a new scenario is no easy task [Kenny et al., 2007a].
While there have been virtual human applications that simulate multiple agents,
many simulate scenarios which need not more than a single agent. Systems that
do not address the interactions between different agents, for instance in forms of
cooperation or conflict, cannot be easily applied to simulate multiple virtual humans
in a same scenario.
Physiological Manifestations vs. External Behavior
Moving past the single or multi-agent aspect, a large portion of the previous re-
search on emotion and personality focus solely on physiological manifestations. This
includes facial expressions [Kasap et al.; Arellano et al.; Egges et al.; Allbeck and
Badler; Egges et al., 2009; 2008; 2003; 2002; 2004], body movement and non-verbal
behavior [Pham and Wardhani, 2005], and generally visual features of 3D animated
agents.
Bartneck discusses the possibilities and issue of integrating OCC emotions to em-
bodied agents [Bartneck, 2002]. The authors state that an important issue is that
not all 22 emotions can be communicated through animations. For instance, the an-
imations for Gratification and Gratitude would look very similar even though they
have different trigger conditions.
Egges et al. define a relationship between FFM and goals, standards, and attitudes
to generate dialog [Egges et al., 2004]. For instance, Highly Conscientious agents are
less likely to abandon their goals or highly Open agents are more likely to change
their standards in new situations.
The research focusing on physiological expressions of emotion and personality rarely
consider their effects on reasoning and decision making. In other words, their focus is




In this section, I provided an outline for previous work in believable character
models in automatic storytelling. I discussed what believable agents are, how they
are different from intelligent agents, and what qualities make them believable. I also
identified personality and emotion as two of such important qualities.
In sum, the key differences between previous relevant research and my proposed
models of emotion and personality are as follows.
• I adapt personality and emotion into strong story, not strong autonomy, to
leverage the strengths of such systems.
• I do not overlook any of the five factors of personality, even though this may
come at the cost of oversimplifying the original psychology model.
• I rely on existing narrative structures to model emotion and personality in order
to minimize the author burden and improve the models’ reusability for various
story domains.
• My models account for interactions between different characters and their ex-
pectations about each other, which makes it more effective in multi-agent sim-
ulations.
• I provide models for character personality and emotion that manifest through
their external behavior and not natural language dialog or physiology, such as




One similarity between AI and narrative research is that both reason about actions
and plans. Both model characters / agents that form plans and take actions to achieve
their goals. Where AI planning systems seek to find a plan to achieve a goal, narrative
planning systems generate plans for a collection of characters to represent how they
plan to succeed, thwart, or overcome. In this section, I will introduce and informally
discuss the concepts and processes used in narrative planning. I will provide the
formal definitions of these concepts later in Chapter 4.
3.1.1 Example Story Domain
I use the following example throughout this paper. I will refer to this example
as Tom’s Tale. Tom is sick and needs medicine. He has two coins and he wants to
acquire the medicine while spending the least number of coins. He could either go to
a nearby town and spend one coin to buy the medicine from a Merchant or he could
go to a nearby forest and make it using herbs that grow there. Although he believes
that he could do the latter, in reality, there are no herbs in forest that he could use
to make the medicine.
Tom also knows that there is a Bandit in the forest that could steal all his coins.
Tom can buy a sword from the merchant that prevents the bandit from robbing him.
Having a sword also gives Tom the option to steal the medicine from the merchant.
Both the bandit and the merchant want to have as many coins as they can.
3.1.2 Narrative Planning Problems
A planning problem is typically described by specifying an initial state of the world
and some author-defined goals that the system is meant to achieve. In classical plan-
ning, the initial state represents a complete description of the world. I use Helmert’s
definition of logical propositions to represent an initial state [Helmert, 2006]. The
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story world is comprised of a set of variables, and a proposition is the assignment of
a value to a variable. For instance, in Tom’s Tale, we could represent the initial state
as follows:
at(Tom) = Home ∧ at(Merchant) = Town ∧ at(Bandit) = Forest∧
at(Medicine) = Merchant ∧ at(Sword) = Merchant∧
at(Coin1) = Tom ∧ at(Coin2) = Tom
Here, the ∧ symbol represents the AND operator. These propositions state that
Tom is at his home, the merchant is at the town, the bandit is at the forest, the
merchant has the medicine and a sword, and Tom has two coins.
Author goals are defined as a set of logical propositions that must hold at the end
of a story. For example, the author goals in Tom’s tale can be represented by the
following propositions:
{at(Medicine) = Tom, at(Coin1) = Bandit}
The author wants his stories to end in Tom acquiring the medicine or the bandit
robbing Tom.
In contrast to previous narrative planners [Riedl and Young; Ware and Young;
Shirvani et al., 2004; 2011; 2017], I represent the author goals using utility functions.
A utility function is a function that receives a state and produces a number. Higher
numbers indicate better consequences. I represent a utility function by a sequence of
conditionals that are evaluated in order. If none of the conditions hold, the function
returns 01. The author goals stated above are translated into the following function:
U(s) =
〈
at(Medicine) = Tom→ 1,
at(Coin1) = Bandit→ 1,
〉
1I will provide a formal definition in Chapter 4.
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action Go(Character c*, Place to)
PRE: True
EFF: at(c) = to
action Buy(Character c1*, Character c2*, Item i, Place p)
PRE at(c1) = p ∧ at(c2) = p ∧ at(i) = c2 ∧ at(Coin1) = c1
EFF at(i) = c1 ∧ at(Coin1) = c2
action Rob(Character c1*, Character c2, Place p)
PRE at(c1) = p ∧ at(c2) = p ∧ at(Coin1) = c2 ∧ at(Coin2) = c2
EFF at(Coin1) = c1 ∧ at(Coin2) = c1
action Steal(Character c1*, Character c2, Item i, Place p)
PRE at(c1) = p ∧ at(c2) = p ∧ at(i) = c2 ∧ at(Sword) = c1
EFF at(i) = c1
Figure 3.1: Actions in the Tom’s Tale Domain
The argument s is the state in which we calculate the value of the utility function.
For instance, in the initial state, the author’s utility function is 0. If Tom acquires
the medicine or the bandit robs Tom, the author’s utility function is increased by 1.
A planning problem is defined in the context of a story domain. A story domain
consists of a set of types, a set of constants, and a set of all possible actions. The
set of types represent the possible types for each object in the world, e.g. Character,
Place, Location. The set of constants represent each object in the world and their
corresponding type. For instance, constants Tom, Merchant, and Bandit are constants
of type Character, while Medicine, Herbs, and Sword are constants of type Item, and
Home, Town, and Forest are constants of type Place.
Actions are similar to STRIPS operators [Fikes and Nilsson, 1971]. Each action
has three main specifications, the agents / objects that are involved, a precondition
that must hold for that action to be possible, and an effect that specifies how the
world changes as a result of that action. Figure 3.1 presents the actions of the Tom’s
Tale domain.
For instance, action Buy has three arguments, c1 and c2 of type Character and i
of type Item. If c1 and c2 are in the same place, c2 has i, and c1 has Coin1, c1 can
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buy i from c2 for it. As a result of the action, c1 will have i and c2 will have Coin1.
A solution to a classical planning problem is a sequence of actions that achieves




are both solutions to the Tom’s Tale planning problem.
In narrative planning, each character also has a set of goals [Riedl and Young,
2004]. I also represent the goals of a character via a utility function. For instance,
The merchant and the bandit’s utility functions are equal to the number of coins they
have and Tom’s utility function is as follows:
U(Tom, s) =
〈 at(Medicine) = Tom→ 4
at(Coin1) = Tom ∧ at(Coin2) = Tom→ 2,
at(Coin1) = Tom→ 1,
at(Coin2) = Tom→ 1,
〉
This shows that having each coin increases Tom’s utility by 1 and having the
medicine sets it to 4, showing that Tom values the medicine more than each coin. It
is reasonable for him to spend a coin to buy the medicine.
Narrative planners introduce an additional constraint to classical planning; a char-
acter consents to taking an action only if it is in service of one of their goals [Riedl
and Young, 2004] (it helps increase that character’s utility). In that case, we say that
an action is explained for that character. In Figure 3.1, the consenting characters of
each action is specified by a star symbol next to the corresponding argument. For
instance, both characters must consent to action Buy in order to trade an item for a
coin. However, only the robber needs to consent to action Rob and the victim is not
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a consenting character of that action.
A solution to a narrative planning problem is a sequence of actions that increases
the authors utility from the initial state and every action in that sequence is explained




are also solutions to the Tom’s Tale narrative planning problem, since they both
increase the author’s utility and contain only actions that are explained for their
consenting characters. The following is not a solution to a narrative planning problem,
as it achieves the author goal but is not explained for Tom.
〈Go(Tom,Forest), Give(Tom,Bandit, Coin1)〉
3.1.3 State-Space Narrative Planners
State-space planners are a type of planners that search through the space of all
possible world states to find a solution to a planning problem. The space of all
possible world states is represented by a directed graph, called the search space, in
which each edge represents an action and each node represents a state. There is a
directed edge for action a from state s1 to state s2 if the precondition of a holds in
s1 and applying the effects of a to s1 results in s2. Figure 3.2 presents a portion of
the Tom’s Tale state space.
3.1.4 Narrative Planners with a Model of Belief
In state-space narrative planning, a state space is a set of temporally possible worlds
in which states are connected by temporal edges. For example, Figure 3.2 represents
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Figure 3.2: A Portion of the State Space of Tom’s Tale
two possible worlds in which Tom could go to the town and buy the medicine (states
s1 and s3) or buy a sword and steal the medicine (states s1, s2, and s4).
Narrative planners that don’t reason about belief [Ware and Young; Riedl and
Young; Riedl and Young; Ware and Young, 2011; 2004; 2010; 2014], assume their
characters are omniscient. In other words, when a proposition becomes True or False,
all characters become aware of its value. Using those planners, Tom will always know
that there are no herbs in the forest. In order to tell a story in which he wrongly
believes that there are herbs in the forest, we need to extend those planners to include
a model of belief.
I enable previous state spaces to also account for epistemically possible worlds
[Shirvani et al., 2017]. Using epistemic edges, we can model what each character
believes about the state of the world, as well the what they believe other characters
believe and so on.
Figure 3.3 shows an example of epistemically possible worlds that only shows Tom’s
beliefs in the initial state. As you can see, in contrast to temporal edges, the label of
epistemic edges are characters not actions. Following an epistemic edge for character c
from state s1 to state s2 means that when the world state is s1, character c believes the
world state is s2. In a full search space, I define that from each state, there is one and
only one epistemic edge for each character. This means that every character always
commits to what they believe and there is no uncertainty about those beliefs [Shirvani
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Figure 3.3: A Portion of the State Space of Tom’s Tale with Epistemic Edges
et al., 2017]. An epistemic edge may point to the same state if the corresponding
character’s beliefs are the same as the actual world state.
In Figure 3.3, if we follow the edge for Tom (T) and then the edge for the bandit
(B) (states s2 to s11 to s20), we can see what Tom believes the bandit believes. In
doing so, we say that we are inferring about two layers of belief. This model of belief
can simulate infinitely nested layers of belief.
3.1.5 Anticipation
An important advantage of this belief model is that a character can expect certain
actions by other characters and thus incorporate them into their own plans [Shirvani
et al., 2017]. For instance, If the bandit believes that Tom would and could go to the
forest to make medicine, the bandit could incorporate Go(Tom,Forest) into his own
plan to rob Tom. I used the terms would and could because in order for a character to
anticipate the actions of another, those actions must be possible (their precondition
must hold in the preceding state) and those actions must increase that character’s
utility (that character would consent to taking those actions).
This also extends the definition of an explained action as follows. If character c1
can imagine a sequence of actions for character c2 that ends in a state that increases
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c2’s utility, we say that for all actions in that sequence, c1 believes that action is
explained for c2.
A valid character plan for character c is defined as a sequence of actions that
increases c’s utility, and for all actions in that sequence, c believes that action is
explained for all its consenting characters2.
3.1.6 Conflict
Considering that a state space represents the space of all possible worlds, we can
reason about how characters may fail to fulfill their plans. For instance, Tom goes
the forest and realizes that there are no herbs there. In this state, Tom forms another
plan to go to town and buy the medicine. However, there is also another possible
world in which Tom gets robbed by the bandit. This scenario where only one of the
two possible worlds may occur at the same time, is referred to as a conflict.
Ware et al. mark certain actions as intended but not executed to represent a
plan that characters wanted to execute but could not due to causal conflicts with
other characters or the environment [Ware and Young, 2011]. For a character plan,
a conflict represents two possible worlds, one in which the plan fails and another in
which the plan succeeds. A conflict is resolved when the corresponding plan succeeds
or fails.
I update the definition of a conflict using the utility functions that represent char-
acter goals. A conflict ensues when a character c1 expects that their utility could
decrease as a result of a plan of another character c2. We say that a conflict is
resolved when either c1’s utility decreases as a result of that plan or c1 no longer
expects that plan to happen. An example of a conflict in Tom’s Tale is the bandit
robbing Tom when he goes to the forest. When Tom buys the sword from the mer-
chant, Tom no longer expects that the bandit could rob him; thus, we say that the
conflict has been resolved in favor of Tom.
2The formal definitions of explained actions and explained action sequences are presented in Chap-
ter 4.
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As with the above example, characters need to be able to anticipate a conflict. In
my model of anticipation, characters can expect actions of other characters that could
increase their utility, as well as those that could decrease it. In later chapters, I will
show how this definition of conflict is used in explaining character actions, and how
we can enable the experience manager to intelligently generate conflicts.
3.2 Emotion
Reasoning about the emotions of virtual agents helps in the design process and
in reasoning about agent behaviors [Meyer, 2006]. Emotions offer guidance about
the possible consequences of actions and, in turn, motivate other actions in order to
face the resulting emotions. In this section, I will introduce the established model of
emotion in psychology that my model is inspired by.
3.2.1 The OCC Model of Emotion
The OCC model of emotion [Ortony et al., 1990] is one of the most widely known
and validated appraisal-based models of emotion. Different individuals evaluate
(appraise) the same event in different ways and that appraisal is responsible for trig-
gering emotions. Appraisal characterizes individual consequences of events in terms
of the different appraisal variables, such as how desirable those consequences are or
who caused the appraised event.
There are several reasons that the OCC model is suitable for being adapted to
reason about emotional virtual agents.
• Its simple and elegant tree structure and finite set of appraisal variables facili-
tates its adaptation to Artificial Intelligence.
• The objects of the emotions defined by the OCC model, i.e. goals, agents,
actions, and events, are congruent with commonly used notions of virtual agents.
• All emotions are either negatively or positively valenced and their valence is
always the same.
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• The OCC model allows agents to emotionally react to a variety of situations.
Steunebrink et al. extend OCC to include 24 different emotions that are triggered
based on the following appraisal variables [Steunebrink et al., 2009].
• The type of the stimuli could be consequences of events, actions of agents, and
aspects of objects.
• The consequences of an event could be desirable or undesirable for the agent
itself or for other friend / non-friend agents.
• A prospective event is unconfirmed when it has not happened yet and becomes
either confirmed when it occurs or disconfirmed when it does not.
• An action could be praiseworthy or blameworthy based on the standards of an
agent.
• An object could be familiar or unfamiliar to the agent.
Figure 3.4 presents Steunebrink et al.’s revision of the tree structure defined by the
OCC model [Steunebrink et al., 2009]. For instance, satisfaction is triggered when
the consequences of a prospective event are confirmed, or remorse is triggered when
an agent performs a blameworthy action with undesirable consequences.
The model distinguishes between well-being emotions and prospect-based emotions.
Well-being emotions correspond to being pleased or displeased about a desirable or
undesirable event. If a desirable event occurs, the characters feels Joy; but if an un-
desirable event occurs, they feel Distress. In terms of character goals, Joy is triggered
by achieving (sub)goals and Distress is triggered by the failure of a plan or loss of an
active goal.
Prospect-based emotions are centered around the prospect of an event and its
confirmation or disconfirmation. A character feels Hope if they expect a desirable
event to happen and Fear if the expected event is undesirable. Once again in terms
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Figure 3.4: The Hierarchy of OCC Emotions
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Table 3.1: Emotions and Their Corresponding Appraisal Variables
Emotion Appraisal
Joy The occurrence of a desirable event
Distress The occurrence of an undesirable event
Hope An unconfirmed desirable event
Fear An unconfirmed undesirable event
Satisfaction A confirmed desirable event
Fears-Confirmed A confirmed undesirable event
Disappointment A disconfirmed desirable event
Relief A disconfirmed undesirable event
HappyFor A desirable event that is desirable for a friend
Resentment An undesirable event that is desirable for a friend
Gloating A desirable event that is undesirable for a non-friend
Pity An undesirable event that is undesirable for a non-friend
of character goals, Fear is triggered when there is a threat of self-preservation goals
or a conflict.
Once such event occurs (becomes confirmed), Hope turns into Satisfaction and
Fear turns into Fears-confirmed. However, if that event does not occur (becomes
disconfirmed), Hope turns into Disappointment and Fear turns into Relief. Table
3.1 presents a summary of the well-being and prospect-based emotions and their
corresponding appraisal variables.
In my research, I only consider these 12 well-being and prospect-based emotions.
The reason for this choice is that the corresponding appraisal variables of these emo-
tions are related to agent’s goals, plans, and beliefs, all of which are familiar concepts
of a narrative planner.
In contrast, the other appraisal variables depend on an agent’s standards or an
object’s attractiveness and this makes them highly domain dependent. For instance,
the act of slaying a person might be considered praiseworthy in a barbaric Viking-
esque world. In other words, it is not possible to adapt those emotions without
introducing additional author burden into the definition of their story domain, e.g.
labeling every action as praiseworthy or blameworthy.
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3.3 Personality
The personality of a character is reflected by the choices they make in different
situations. These choices must portray a consistent pattern of behaviors to make
the character more believable to the audience. My model of personality is inspired
by the Big Five and the Five Factor model3 [McCrae and Costa; Goldberg, 1987;
1992]. The five factors considered by the Big Five and the FFM are Openness to
experience, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism. An
individual could score high or low on each of the five factors.
The Big Five is a widely-studied taxonomic personality model derived from a factor
analysis of a large number of self and peer reports on personality-relevant adjectives
[DeYoung et al., 2007]. The underlying theory of the Big Five is that personality traits
create basic tendencies [McCrae and Costa, 2003] and with environmental influences,
these tendencies create a disposition for particular behavior [Bouchard Jr and McGue,
2003]. The Big Five is currently widely accepted as a valid description of human
personality traits. It is bounded in biology, and the lexical approach used to determine
the underlying factors carefully refines personality descriptors based on the terms that
are developed over time. There is theoretical and methodological justification for the
validity of this model.
Though the Big Five is rooted in psychology and personality traits in real life, it
can also be used to provide descriptors for fictional characters. MacCrae et al. (2012)
argue that we could apply the methods and findings of contemporary trait psychology
to broad questions about genres and the interpretation of individual characters.
Flekova et al. propose a model to predict the personality of protagonists in nov-
els based on the FFM [Flekova and Gurevych, 2015]. Johnson et al. show that the
FFM can describe the personality of literary figures, at least those in Victorian novels
[Johnson et al., 2008]. The authors gathered data on attributes of fictional characters,
3Although MacCrae et al. distinguish between the Big Five and FFM [McCrae et al., 2012], I will
refer to them interchangeably throughout this document.
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such as their role in the novel, their personal goals, and their romantic styles. Their
analyses showed a correlation between these attributes and the five factors. For exam-
ple, they reported that, as in real life, characters with high Openness to Experience
were motivated by interests in creativity and discovery or those low in Agreeableness
had a strong need for power [Johnson et al.; Johnson et al., 2008; 2011].
While the Big Five refers only to the highest level of a hierarchy of traits, the
FFM refers to a classification of many traits in terms of the five factors. Much of the
research on FFM defines a two-level hierarchy, with the five broad categories, called
factors, at the top subsuming more specific traits, called facets. There is a debate
on the definition of the second layer. For instance, Costa and McCrae produced 6
facets for each of the five factors [Costa and MacCrae, 1992], or the Abridged Big
Five Dimensional Circumplex (AB5C) defines each facet as a blend of two of the five
factors [Hofstee et al., 1992].
I draw primarily from the Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS), which define 10 aspects
(2 per factor) [DeYoung et al., 2007]. My goal is to oversimplify rather than overlook.
In other words, although I simplify each factor, I consider all 10 facets defined by
BFAS, and thus all five factors of the Big Five. This contrasts with other works, e.g.
[Bahamón and Young, 2017], which choose to overlook rather than oversimplify.
Openness to Experience
Highly open individuals—with high scores—are abstract thinkers and motivated by
intrinsic interest. Low scores are observed in conventional and conservative people.
Open individuals can be described as imaginative, creative, and intellectual. The
first BFAS aspect of Openness to experience is (confusingly) named openness, which
focuses on imagination, creativity, and interest in art, music, and nature. The other
aspect, aptly named intellect, is associated with ideas, e.g. enjoying philosophical
discussions and solving complex problems.
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Conscientiousness
High scores are observed in organized and persistent individuals who prioritize
order and efficiency. They are motivated by being active and orderly, in contrast to
people with low scores, who are messy, lazy, and care-free. While individuals with
high Openness are generally better at making plans, highly conscientious ones are best
at implementing those plans. The two aspects of this factor are industriousness and
orderliness. Industrious individuals are self-disciplined and diligent, while orderliness
indicates attention to tidiness and dutifulness.
Extroversion
Extroverts are social, active, optimistic, and motivated by enthusiasm. Introverts
are reserved, shy, and quiet. High scores indicates a tendency to interact with oth-
ers and make friends, while also being assertive and taking charge. The aspects of
Extroversion are enthusiasm and assertiveness. Enthusiasm indicates a tendency to
interact with others and make friends. Assertiveness reflects a strong personality,
who takes charge and leads the way.
Agreeableness
Individuals with high scores are altruistic, cooperative, and empathetic. Low scores
are observed in competitive, distrustful, and uncompromising people. The two as-
pects of Agreeableness are compassion and politeness. Compassionate individuals
show sympathy and tend to take interest in others’ feelings. Individuals lacking po-
liteness are disrespectful and pursue their own goals at the expense of others. While
Extroversion rewards social affiliation, Agreeableness reflects affiliation driven by em-
pathy.
Neuroticism
Neurotic individuals are motivated by their desire to decrease stress and anxiety.
High scores indicates strong emotional reactions to external stimuli and sensitivity
to threat and punishment. Low scores represent fewer observable emotional reac-
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tions. DeYoung et al. distinguish between two aspects of Neuroticism, withdrawal
and volatility [DeYoung et al., 2007]. Withdrawal refers to the inward expression of
negative emotions like depression and anxiety; while volatility is the outward expres-
sions of negative emotions in forms of anger and panic. Withdrawal can be compared
to the behavioral inhibition system, and volatility to the fight or flight instinct.
3.4 Intelligent Generation of Conflicts
The combination of emotion, personality, and strong story enables me to improve
upon the detection and generation of conflict in narrative planning. Before I describe
the mechanics of this process, I need to describe what a conflict and, more generally,
a player choice is and how we can distinguish between different choices.
Mawhorter et al. define a choice structure as follows [Wardrip and Jhala, 2014].
A choice structure consists of the framing, options, and outcomes associated with a
choice. Framing is the content preceding the presentation of a choice that influences
how a player interprets it. Options, along with the framing of a choice, allow ex-
pectations about the consequences of choosing an option. Finally, the outcome of
a choice refers to the content that is presented when each option is chosen. As an
example, assume that as the player enters the forest, they are faced with the bandit
who draws their sword. This frames a choice for the player with three options: the
player could either do nothing, flee, or, in the context of this example, try to talk
their way out of being robbed. The actual outcomes of this choice may match the
player’s expectations or not, e.g. the player may succeed or fail to talk his way out
of being robbed.
In order to reason about a choice, we need to make assumptions about player
goals, player expectations, and perceived outcomes [Mateas et al., 2015]. An author
can predict some basic player goals, e.g. they want to keep their character healthy
and alive, and use methods for encouraging the pursuit of various goals. If the player
indeed values their character’s health, a choice that would put the player character’s
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health at risk can cause tension. On the other hand, for the players who don’t value
those goals, the choice will lack the tension that the author intended, but it does not
mean that the author’s strategy for creating a tense moment was invalid. Indeed,
strong story allows us to explore all possible stories, but if the domain defined by
the author does not allow any stories that achieve what the author wants, that is a
problem with the domain, not the experience manager
Consider the choice and its options mentioned in the last paragraph. While gener-
ating this choice, the system determines a player expectation for each option based
on the player goals and the perceived outcomes, i.e. how the player would expect the
outcomes of an option affect their goals. The perceived outcome of an option could
be one of the following cases:
• Irrelevant: this outcome does not affect a goal.
• Hinder or fail: this outcome hinders progress towards achieving a goal or directly
fails a goal.
• Advances or achieves: this outcome contributes to achieving a goal or directly
achieves a goal.
In this example, the option of doing nothing hinders the player’s goal. Being robbed
by the bandit hinders the player’s goal because they lose their coins. On the other
hand, the option to flee is irrelevant to their goal, because they need to collect the
herbs in the forest to advance their plan (of making the medicine). It is only through
the third option, to talk out of being robbed, that the player expects to advance their
goal.
We can consider conflicts as choices with perceived outcomes that hinder or fail a
goal. Presenting the player with a conflict is one way that authors can encourage the
pursuit of certain goals. For instance, in the example above, by presenting the option
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to talk their way out of a dangerous situation, the author can encourage the player
to use their wit and social skills.
On the other hand, imagine that the player is presented with the same choice, but
instead of the option to talk to the bandit, they had the option to draw their own
sword and attack the bandit. The presentation of this choice implicitly encourages
violence to resolve conflicts. We can distinguish between different choices (conflicts)
based on their options.
I must distinguish between implicit and explicit encouragement. In implicit encour-
agement of a behavior type, the system makes sure to always provide the player with
the option to resolve conflicts using that behavior type. This reasoning takes place
before the player is presented with a conflict. If the system is unable to implicitly
encourage the intended behavior, it does not present the conflict to the player.
In explicit encouragement of a behavior type, the system expresses affirmation
through symbolic representations after the player has demonstrated that type of be-
havior. More specifically, if the player chooses to exhibit the intended behavior, they
see more positive results, and otherwise, more negative results. For instance, the
author specifies that if the player attacks any of the NPCs, they receive a lower
overall score on their performance. While the proposed system enables implicit en-
couragement, the author can always devise the story domain to also enable explicit
encouragement. Authors will most likely intend to explicitly, as well as implicitly, en-
courage behaviors in training simulations. However, implicit encouragement suffices
in most entertainment applications, as the author may not want to directly punish
or reward the player for making choices.
I use this notion in conjunction with planning, emotion, and personality. While
exploring the story space, the system recognizes a conflict for the player when the
player fears a negative outcome. In other words, the player expects an outcome and
fears that it will hinder or fail at least one of their goals. The system then searches
49
for options that advance the player goal and make them feel relieved instead. This
is where the strong-story nature of the system shines, as it can explore all possible
worlds that could ensue by different courses of action. This also allows them to reason
about the player’s expectations based on their goals and beliefs. After reasoning about
these considerations, a strong-story system can then puppeteer all virtual characters
to guide the player experience on the intended trajectory.
Considering a personality model, a choice option reflects one or more personal-
ity traits. For instance, the option to talk to the bandit reflects being social and
extroverted, and the option to attack the bandit conveys a disagreeable trait. By
distinguishing between options based on the traits they represent, the system intel-
ligently chooses to create a conflict for the player or not. As a result, it enables the
author to encourage certain types of behaviors in the player. For instance, assume the
author wants to encourage Agreeableness. The systems foresees the choice described
above, the bandit facing the player with his sword drawn, and searches for options
that convey Agreeableness. If it fails to find such option, the bandit would never
show up to face the player in the first place.
Similar to assuming player goals in the above paragraphs, the system does its best
to tell a good story to the extent that the author-provided story domain allows it,
and the absence of a conflict does not mean the system’s strategy was invalid.
There are some considerations in the application of this model. First, I emphasize
that this model encourages the player to adopt specific personality traits at specific
times to deal with specific types of situations. It does not mean that the system
attempts to change the player’s personality as a result of assuming the role of that
character.
Second, as mentioned, strong story works best in serious games and training simu-
lations where the author often aims to encourage certain types of behaviors. However,
it does not mean that strong-story systems would not work for entertainment appli-
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cations. In an entertainment context, we can use conflicts to elicit player values or
improve enjoyment and immersion by ensuring that player choices are always com-
patible with their personality and rarely, if ever, push them out of their comfort
zone.
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I build on what Helmert calls a Multi-Valued Planning Task [Helmert, 2006]. A
virtual world is represented by some number of variables, each of which is assigned
a value. For example, Tom’s location is a variable that could be assigned the value
Town, Forest, etc 1. An assignment of a value u to a variable v is written v = u.
Definition 1. A proposition follows the grammar p → True|False|v = u|p ∧ p. In
other words, I permit four kinds of propositions: the constants True and False, the
assignment of a value to a variable, and a conjunction of such propositions.
Definition 2. A state is a function which, for any proposition, returns True or False.
For instance, the initial state of Tom’s Tale return True for at(Bandit) = Forest and
False for at(Herbs) = Forest.
Definition 3. An action a describes an event which can occur in the world using the
following specifications:
• Pre(a): A proposition—the precondition of a—that must hold immediately
before the action occurs.
• Eff(a): A proposition—the effect of a—that becomes True immediately after
a. The action effect is required to be deterministic.
• Par(a): A set of constants that are involved in a.
1Here at(Tom) and at(Herbs) are two different variables (not functions). In my examples, I use
notations, such as at, to make these variables more readable. but the planner considers each
variable as a unique symbol.
52
Preconditions and effects cannot be contradictory. For instance, Pre(a) or Eff(a)
of action a cannot be
at(Bandit) = Forest ∧ at(Bandit) = Town
Definition 4. A state space is a graph whose nodes are states and whose directed
edges represent actions. An edge s
a→ s′ exists if action a’s precondition is satisfied
in state s and applying a’s effects would change the state to s′. Figure 3.2 presents
an example of a state space.
Definition 5. A plan is a sequence of actions, or a path through the state space.
4.1.2 Narrative Planning Problem
Narrative planners ([Porteous et al.; Young et al., 2010; 2013], and many others)
extend this formalism to tell believable stories. They reason about the author’s goal,
as well as the beliefs and goals of each character. Rather than expressing goals as
propositions, I use utility functions.
Definition 6. A narrative planning problem is defined as 〈s0, U, A, C, UC〉 where s0
is the initial state, U is the author utility function, A is a set of actions, C is a set of
characters, and UC is a set of character utility functions.
Definition 7. The initial state is a conjunction which contains an assignment for
every domain variable. It represents the state of the world before any planning takes
place. The initial state of Tom’s Tale is as follows.
at(Tom) = Home ∧ at(Merchant) = Town ∧ at(Bandit) = Forest∧
at(Medicine) = Merchant ∧ at(Sword) = Merchant∧
at(Coin1) = Tom ∧ at(Coin2) = Tom
Definition 8. A utility function is a function that receives a state as input and
returns a real number. Although my models make no particular commitment to
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how a utility function is defined, I use the following definition to describe the utility
functions in the presented examples. I represent a utility function as a sequence of
conditional expressions, in form p→ n (if proposition p holds then real number n),
〈p1 → n1, p2 → n2, ..., pm → nm〉
This sequence is evaluated in order and if no condition holds in a given state, the
function returns 0.
A utility function is defined by the author for the overall story, denoted by U(s),
and every character, denoted by U(c, s) ∈ UC . For instance, the author’s utility
function in Tom’s Tale is as follows.
U(s) =
〈
at(Medicine) = Tom→ 1,
at(Coin1) = Bandit→ 1,
〉
Definition 9. A character c ∈ C is defined as a special constant that represents an
agent with intentions and beliefs. The intentions of a character are defined in terms
of a utility function (U(c, s)). Each character intends to increase the value of their
utility function. For instance, Tom’s utility function is as follows.
U(Tom, s) =
〈 at(Medicine) = Tom→ 4
at(Coin1) = Tom ∧ at(Coin2) = Tom→ 2,
at(Coin1) = Tom→ 1,
at(Coin2) = Tom→ 1,
〉
Definition 10. In narrative planning, an action a ∈ A has the following additions
to Definition 3:
• Con(a): A set of characters ∈ C where Con(a) ⊆ Par(a), that shows which
characters are responsible for taking the action. This set includes the characters
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who must have a reason to take the action and not necessarily all characters
affected by that action. For instance, in action Rob, the robber is a consenting
character, but the victim is not.
• Obs(a, s): A set of characters ∈ C that shows the characters who observe the
action when it occurs. Obs(a, s) is a function of the current state and the
parameters of the action2.
For example in Figure 3.1, The parameters of action Go are character c and place
to, and that character is the consenting character. The precondition of Go is True,
which means that the action is possible in any given state, and its effect is that the
character is now at to. The set of observing characters of Go is defined as all the
characters at to, as well as the consenting character.
4.1.3 Narrative Planners with Beliefs
Actions also change the beliefs of characters. The beliefs of a character are repre-
sented by modal propositions believes(c, p) (or b(c, p) for short), meaning character c
believes proposition p. The grammar for propositions is extended to:
p→ True|False|v = u|p ∧ p|b(c, p)
and the following applies to beliefs about conjunctions:
b(c, p ∧ q)↔ b(c, p) ∧ b(c, q)
Belief propositions can be nested, e.g. b(c1, b(c2, p)) means character c1 believes
that character c2 believes proposition p. For example, the following propositions hold
2Although methods for automatically determining action observers have been suggested by others
[Christian and Young; Ten Brinke et al.; Teutenberg and Porteous, 2004; 2014; 2015], this model





b(Tom, b(Bandit, Location(Herbs) = Forest)
The closed world assumption is also extended to account for character beliefs.
• When a belief for a proposition is not explicitly stated for a character, that
character is assumed to believe the true value of that proposition, i.e. b(c, p)↔ p
unless stated otherwise.
• Unless explicitly stated otherwise, characters are assumed to believe that other
characters believe the same things they do, i.e. ∀ci, cj ∈ C : b(ci, b(cj, p)) ↔
b(ci, p) unless stated otherwise.
Definition 11. For some sequence of actions π in a state s, let α(π, s) denote the
state after taking the actions in π. In Figure 3.3, α(〈Go(Tom,Forest)〉, s1) = s2. α
is only defined when, for every action a ∈ π, the precondition of a is satisfied in the
state immediately before taking a, i.e. s |= Pre(a).
Definition 12. For some character c in a state s, let β(c, s) denote what c believes
the state to be when it is actually s. In Figure 3.3, β(Tom, s1) = s10. In s1, there are
no herbs in the forest, but in s10 there are, so Tom wrongly believes there are herbs
in the forest. The belief notation also shows that this model limits each character to
have exactly one belief about every proposition in the domain. In other words, we
cannot show that a character is uncertain about a proposition.
After taking action a, the beliefs of every character may be updated as follows3:
• ∀c ∈ C : c ∈ Obs(a, s)⇒β(c, α(a, s)) = α(a, β(c, s))
3The details of updating character beliefs for an action whose effect models b(c, p), e.g. to model
deception, are not directly relevant to my models of emotion or personality. For full details,
please refer to Shirvani et al. (2017).
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• ∀c ∈ C : c /∈ Obs(a, s)⇒β(c, α(a, s)) = β(c, s).
It is possible that character c believes the precondition of action a is False and yet
observes a. In that case, c’s beliefs are first updated to believe the preconditions
of a (to believe that action was possible contrary to their wrong beliefs) and then
believe its effects. In other words, if c ∈ Obs(a, s) and ¬b(c, Pre(a)), after observing
a, b(c, Eff(a) ∧ ∀p : Pre(a) |= p ∧ Eff(a) 6|= p ⇒ p) where p is an assignment to a
variable or a belief proposition. I refer to this as a surprise action. Since the character
is surprised by an action that they believed was not possible.
For instance, if Tom did not believe that the bandit is in the forest, after Tom
observes action Rob, he first believes the precondition of Rob, i.e. the bandit is in the
forest, and then its effect, i.e. bandit has his coins now.
4.1.4 Narrative Planning Solution
Various narrative planning frameworks differ in how they define explained actions.
I use the following definition for explained actions.
Definition 13. In state s, an action a is explained for character c ∈ Con(a) when
there exists a sequence of actions π such that:
1. a is the first action in π
2. U(c, α(π, β(c, s))) > U(c, s)
3. Every action after a in π is explained.
4. π does not contain a strict subsequence that also meets these four requirements.
In other words, an action makes sense for a character when that character can imagine
a plan that (1) starts with that action, (2) they believe will lead to a higher utility, (3)
the plan makes sense for the other consenting characters, and (4) it doesn’t contain
unnecessary or redundant actions.
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Definition 14. In state s, an action a is explained when, for all consenting characters
c ∈ Con(a), a is explained for c in s. In other words, an action is explained when it
is explained for all the characters that need a reason to take it. Characters can have
different reasons for taking an action. Tom can buy the medicine because he wants
it, and the merchant will sell it because she wants coins. The merchant has no reason
to give away the medicine, so Tom cannot expect her to.
Definition 15. A sequence of actions π is explained when, for all actions a ∈ π, a is
explained in the state before a occurs. In other words, a sequence is explained when
all its actions are explained.
Definition 16. A solution to a narrative planning problem is an explained sequence
of actions that increases the author’s utility and does not contain a strict subsequence
that also meets these requirements.
Note that one character can expect another character to act; I call this anticipation
[Shirvani et al., 2017]. A character should not only anticipate actions that help them
increase their utility, e.g. expecting the merchant to consent to Buy, but also those
that could decrease their utility, e.g. expecting Rob.
Definition 17. A sequence of actions π is expected for character c in state s when
every action in π is explained and c’s utility is changed as a result of π, i.e.
U(c, α(π, β(c, s))) > U(c, s) ∨ U(c, α(π, β(c, s))) < U(c, s)
This criterion highlights the difference between this definition and the definition
of an explained sequence of actions (Definition 15). An expected sequence of actions
for c does not necessarily lead to a higher utility for c. For instance, we cannot say
that Rob is explained for Tom because Tom is not a consenting character. However,
we say that Rob is expected for Tom because it could decrease his utility and (Tom
believes that) it is explained for the action’s consenting character, the bandit.
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Indeed, characters can expect actions (often the actions of others) to decrease their
utility. In keeping with the ideals of a strong-story system, characters can expect
many sequences, not just one. Characters do not commit to a single expectation
(what a BDI system might call an intention), but can expect any sequence that
meets these requirements. This enables the planner to choose from a wide variety of
believable stories when trying to meet the author’s requirements.
In the next section, I will expand these definitions to incorporate emotions and
personality. I will show how emotions are triggered as a consequence of actions and
how characters distinguish between different plans based on their personality.
4.2 Emotion
The OCC model of emotion [Ortony et al., 1990] defines 22 different emotions. Out
of 22, 12 emotions are triggered based on the significance of events to goals, whereas
the rest also consider the standards and attitudes of a character towards events and
objects. Only the former set of emotions can be readily adapted into narrative plan-
ning without introducing a degree of domain-dependence. In this document, I will
focus on the 12 emotions presented in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 presents how each emotion is triggered based on the the consequences of
events for the character itself or other characters [Ortony et al., 1990].
An event is desirable for a character if it achieves their goal (increases their utility)
or undesirable if it causes their goal to fail (decreases their utility). On the other hand,
a prospective event is unconfirmed when it has not occurred yet (the character expects
that it could happen), confirmed when it actually occurs (the character observes
it), and disconfirmed when it does not eventually happen (the character no longer
expects it to happen). The model defines prospective emotions as expecting an event
to occur at a certain time. Since there is no planning structure that keeps track of
time, I change the definition of a disconfirmed event to “when the event is no longer
expected to happen.”
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Column 4 adapts these trigger conditions to narrative planning based on a charac-
ter’s utility function. Since the model of belief allows characters to form expectations
about events, the emotions triggered based on prospective events can be adapted to
with no additional cost to domain independence.
4.2.1 Positive Emotions
In this section, I provide a formal definition of how each positive emotion is triggered
and how the intensity of an emotion is calculated.
1. Joy
Definition: Joy is triggered for character c at state s after taking/observing
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action a if U(c, s) > U(c, s′), such that α(a, s′) = s.
Intensity: How much c’s utility increases after a or U(c, s)− U(c, s′).
Example: Joy is triggered for Tom in state s5 because his utility increases to
3.
2. Hope
Definition: Character c feels Hope to achieve utility u as long as there is at least
one expected plan π starting from state s, such that hu = U(c, α(π, β(c, s)))
and hu > U(c, s). I refer to hu as hoped utility.
Intensity: How much c’s utility increases when it reaches hu or U(c, s)− hu.
Example: In state s1, Tom hopes for utility values 4 (by making the medicine
himself) or 3 (by buying the medicine).
3. Satisfaction
Definition: Satisfaction is triggered for character c at state s if U(c, s) = hu,
such as hu is the corresponding hoped utility. if a character is surprised by an
action that increases their utility, they feel Joy but not Satisfaction.
Intensity: The intensity of the corresponding Hope.
Example: Satisfaction triggers for Tom in s5 for achieving his hoped utility of
3.
4. Relief
Definition: Relief is triggered for character c at state s if c no longer fears
utility fu—Fear is defined later—and U(c, s) > fu.
Intensity: The reciprocal of the intensity of the corresponding Fear.
Example: Relief is triggered for Tom at state s31 because Tom buys a sword
and no longer expects to be robbed.
5. HappyFor
Definition: Character c feels happy for character c′ at state s after action a if
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for c, c ∈ Con(a) or U(c, s) > U(c, s′), and for c′, U(c′, s) > U(c′, s′), such that
α(a, s′) = s.
Intensity: How much c′’s utility increases or U(c′, s)− U(c′, s′).
Example: HappyFor is triggered for Tom at state s5 because after buying the
medicine, the merchant’s utility is increased by 1.
6. Gloating
Definition: Character c feels gloating towards character c′ at state s after
action a if for c, c ∈ Con(a) or U(c, s) > U(c, s′), and for c′, U(c′, s) < U(c′, s′),
such that α(a, s′) = s.
Intensity: How much c′’s utility decreases or U(c′, s′)− U(c′, s).
Example: Gloating is triggered for the bandit at state s3 because the bandit’s
utility increases to 2 and Tom’s utility decreases to 0.
4.2.2 Negative Emotions
The set of negative emotions are as follows.
1. Distress
Definition: Distress is triggered for character c at state s after taking/observ-
ing action a if U(c, s) < U(c, s′), such that α(a, s′) = s.
Intensity: How much c’s utility decreases after a or U(c, s)− U(c, s′).
Example, Distress is triggered for Tom in state s3 because his utility reduces
to 0.
2. Fear
Definition: Character c fears that their utility could decrease to u as long as
there is at least one expected plan π starting from state s, such that fu =
U(c, α(π, β(c, s))) and fu < U(c, s). I refer to fu as feared utility.
Intensity: How much c’s utility decreases when it reaches fu or fu− U(c, s).
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Example: Tom fears his utility to decrease to 0 because he expects that the
bandit could and would steal his coins.
3. FearsConfirmed
Definition: FearsConfirmed is triggered for character c at state s if U(c, s) =
fu, such as fu is the corresponding feared utility. If a character is surprised by
an action that decreases their utility, they feel Distress but not FearsConfirmed.
Intensity: The intensity of the corresponding Fear.
Example: FearsConfirmed is triggered at s3 when Tom is robbed as he feared
he would be.
4. Disappointment:
Definition: Disappointment is triggered for character c at state s if c no longer
hopes for utility hu and U(c, s) < hu.
Intensity: The reciprocal of that of the corresponding Hope.
Example: Disappointment is triggered for Tom in state s2 because he realizes
there are no herbs in the forest.
5. Resentment
Definition: Character c feels resentment for character c′ at state s after action
a if for c, U(c, s) < U(c, s′) and for c′, c′ ∈ Con(a) or U(c′, s) > U(c′, s′), such
that α(a, s′) = s.
Intensity: How much c’s utility decreases or U(c, s)− U(c, s′).
Example: Resentment is triggered for Tom at state s3 because the bandit’s
utility increases to 2 and Tom’s utility decreases to 0.
6. Pity
Definition: Character c feels pity for character c′ at state s after action a if
U(c, s) < U(c, s′) and U(c′, s) < U(c′, s′), such that α(a, s′) = s.
Intensity: How much c′’s utility decreases or U(c′, s)− U(c′, s′).
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4.2.3 Defining a Conflict using Emotions
A conflict occurs when a character’s plan could decrease another character’s utility,
and a conflict is resolved when either that character’s utility has decreased as a result
of that plan or that plan is no longer expected to occur. Using the emotion definitions
above, a conflict is defined as follows:
Definition 18. A conflict occurs for character c in state s when in state s, c fears
that their utility could decrease to a lower number. A conflict is resolved when the
corresponding fear is transformed either into Relief or FearsConfirmed.
For instance, Tom fears the bandit could rob him (the anticipation of conflict).
This conflict could be resolved in two ways. If Tom goes to the forest and gets robbed
by the bandit, Tom will feel FearsConfirmed. On the other hand, if Tom goes to town
and buys a sword, he will resolve the conflict and feel Relief.
By defining a conflict in terms of Fear, I am considering many similar plans that
trigger the same Fear emotion as the same conflict. For instance, let’s assume Tom
is in the forest and he fears that the bandit could rob him. Tom fears this plan:
〈Rob(Bandit, Tom)〉
If Tom goes to town, this plan is no longer possible. However, Tom would not




〈Go(Bandit, Town), Rob(Bandit, Tom)〉
Indeed, Tom fears all plans that end up in the bandit robbing him (feared utility
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of 0). It is only after he buys a sword that his Fear turns to Relief and the conflict
is resolved. This improves upon many previous models of conflict, e.g. [Ware and
Young, 2011], that consider these two situations as two different conflicts. According
to those models, to resolve the conflict of Tom getting robbed by the bandit, Tom
can just leave the forest. But that is simply not true. Even though the state has
changed, the character still expects the feared utility (that they could be robbed).
Moreover, using previous planners, e.g. [Riedl and Young; Ware and Young; Shir-
vani et al., 2010; 2014; 2017], this conflict could not be resolved in favor of Tom. This
is because “buying a sword” does not increase Tom’s utility and thus, is not a valid
character plan (see Definition 13). Therefore, I need to update the definition of an
explained action to enable this type of story.
4.2.4 Emotional Planning
Based on the expected emotions, I redefine explained actions as follows.
Definition. In state s, an action a is explained for character c ∈ Con(a) when there
exists a sequence of actions π such that:
1. a is the first action in π
2. A positive emotion is triggered for c in α(π, β(c, s)).
3. Every action after a in π is explained.
4. π does not contain a strict subsequence that also meets these four requirements.
According to the previous definition (Definition 13), criteria 2 states that an action
is explained for character c if it increases c’s utility, thus making them feel Joy or
Satisfaction. My definition of explained actions generalizes criteria 2 to include all
other positive emotions. For instance, characters can now consent to actions in pursuit
of friendship or rivalry to feel HappyFor or Gloating. Characters can also act in
response to their fears (expected sequences of actions that could decrease their utility)
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to feel Relief. A simple example is when Tom decides to buy a sword. This is an
explained action because, with the sword, he is relieved that the bandit can no longer
rob him. His utility not only does not increase, but also decreases for using one of his
coins. In short, the proposed model allows characters to act emotionally rather than
just rationally.
4.3 Personality
Depending on the story domain, a narrative planner can find multiple valid plans
for every character. Existing planning systems return the first valid plan, which is
potentially the shortest, unless explicitly asked otherwise.
However, I believe that this choice must depend on the character’s personality
rather than being non-deterministic. We have already answered why characters choose
to act—to feel positive emotions—and now we should address how they act—based
on their personality. There are different ways to achieve the same goal, e.g. how we
affect other characters in the story. In order to distinguish between different plans,
we can select a set of features to describe those plans to then use those features to
rank them based on different personalities. Those features should represent plans
independent of their domain-specific details in order to be reusable in different story
domains.
In the next section, I will describe what behavior patterns each factor represents
and how they are adapted to narrative planning. Before I discuss adapting the FFM
to narrative planning, I must clarify the limitations of my model. First, I strive
to achieve high domain independence to make it easy to apply the model to many
story domains. In doing so, I intentionally limit myself to structures already provided
by narrative planners. For instance, since narrative planning does not readily allow
defining social conventions, modeling the markers of Openness or Conscientiousness
that address those concepts comes at the cost of impairing domain independence.
Moreover, I focus on expressing character personality through external actions,
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particularly via the choice between different actions, since domain actions are the
building blocks of narrative planning. This additionally restricts modeling certain
aspects of the FFM that correspond to internal thoughts that are addressed more
frequently in other contexts such as theater or novels.
4.3.1 Character Personality Vector
A character’s personality is represented by a personality vector 〈p1, . . . , p5〉 for each
of the five factors where pi is a real number in [0, 1]. Factor values 0 and 1 respectively
represent the lowest and highest scores of the corresponding factor. The author is
responsible for specifying a character’s personality and if not specified, a character
will have 0.5 for all their factor values.
However, to avoid having authors to first learn about the five factors before creating
their characters. I give the author the option to describe their characters using a set
of markers that are automatically mapped into a personality vector.
Table 4.2 presents the markers and their corresponding factor. The author can use
one of the adjectives in each row to describe their characters (representing either 0 or
1 for that row). If the author omits using an adjective from a row, the value of that
row is considered 0.5. Each factor’s score is set to the average of its two values.
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Table 4.3: Proposed Personality Plan Features
F Feature Facet Description (High scores)
O
CPF Intellect The intensity of Satisfaction
SPF Openness Average intensity of the Fear (R)
C
SEF Orderliness # of actions with self as the
consenting character
EPF Industriousness # of actions in a plan (R)
E
SPF Enthusiasm # of actions with other
consenting characters
ASPF Assertiveness # of actions with other
non-consenting characters
A
COOPF Compassion Average intensity of HappyFor
PPF Politeness Average intensity of Gloating
(R)
N
SRF Withdrawal The intensity of Relief
NBF Volatility # of times the character changes
their mind
4.3.2 Plan Features
Given multiple plans that could achieve their goal, an agent should choose the one
which best fits its personality. In order to do so, a plan is described by a set of
features, presented in Table 4.3, that can be automatically calculated across different
story domains.
I must note that features marked as (R) are negatively correlated with their cor-
responding aspect. For instance, EPF in Table 4.3 is “# of actions in a plan (R).”
This means highly conscientious agents try to minimize the number of actions in their
plans, but low conscientious agents maximize and choose the longest plan. On the
contrary, feature SEF is positively correlated to conscientiousness, so highly conscien-
tious agents maximize the number of actions with themselves as consenting characters
(and vice versa).
Creative Plan Feature
According to Boden (2004)’s model of creativity [Boden et al., 2004], creativity
refers to the exploration and transformation of a conceptual space by creative agents.
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More specifically, a conceptual space is a set of concepts and creativity is the act of
identifying new concepts within that space. Here, I focus on exploratory creativity,
which is the process of searching an area of the conceptual space governed by certain
rules. These rules not only determine the membership of concepts to the conceptual
space but also their value.
In this context, a concept is a plan and the conceptual space is the space of all
possible plans. Based on this definition, a creative character is capable of exploring
this space to find the most valuable concept (the plan that maximizes their utility—
feeling Satisfaction with the highest intensity). By saying that creative individuals
tend to maximize their satisfaction, I do not mean that unimaginative individuals
do not value Satisfaction; they simply are not creative enough to be able to think of
plans that maximizes their satisfaction.
The Creative Plan Feature (CRPF) of plan π for character c is equal to the intensity
of the Satisfaction that c expects to be triggered at the end of π.
In Tom’s Tale, with high Intellect, Tom makes the medicine himself because it
maximizes his utility by not losing a coin.
Successful Plan Feature
Highly open individuals are intellectual; they want to solve complex problems and
their plans rarely fail. The Successful Plan Feature (SPF) shows how a character
choose plans that are more likely to succeed. Here, the likelihood of success refers to
the number of expected plans that could cause that character’s plan to fail or could
decrease their utility. For instance, the likelihood of success of going to the forest is
lower than that of going to the town because it is possible for Tom to get robbed in
the forest.
Considering plan π for character c starting from state s, there is a set of expected
plans P such that all expected plans pi in P have the following criteria:
• c fears expected plan pi.
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• Expected plan pi starts with a sequence of actions seq with minimum length 1,
such that c is a consenting character of all actions in seq, and seq ⊂ π.
The successful plan feature (SPF) of plan π is calculated as the average intensity of
Fear triggered by π.
SPF (c, π, P ) =
∑
pi ∈ P
I(I(Fear(c, pi)) > 0)∑
pi ∈ P
I(Fear(c, pi))
Where, I returns the intensity of the corresponding emotion and function I is an
indicator function4 and returns 1 if the condition holds and 0 otherwise. In short,
the character takes actions that they do not expect could fail. In Tom’s Tale, with
high Openness, Tom buys the medicine because this plan is the least likely to fail.
Self-Efficacy Feature
This feature is meant to represent the self-confidence and self-efficacy of conscien-
tious individuals. The plans are preferred that express independence and self-reliance.
The Self-Efficacy Feature (SEF) of character c for plan π is calculated the number of
actions that c is taking themselves.




Where, ai represents an action in plan π. For instance, if Tom’s Orderliness was
low, he would wait for the merchant to come to him to sell the medicine rather than
going to town himself.
Efficient Plan Feature
Conscientious individuals are industrious and focused, and thus get things done
quickly and efficiently. The Efficient Plan Feature (EPF) of plan π reflects minimizing
the length (number of actions) of π.
4An indicator function receives a condition that can be true or false, e.g. a < b, a > b, a ∈ b, etc.
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EPF (c, π) =
1
|π|
Where, |π| represents the length of π. In Tom’s Tale, if Tom is highly Industrious,
he prefers to buy the medicine because that plan only has two steps.
Social Plan Feature
Since extroverts prefer to include others into their everyday lives, they tend to
prefer actions that involve as many other characters as possible. The Social Plan
Feature (SPF) of plan π for character c is calculated as the number of other consenting
characters in π.





Where, C is the set of characters in the domain. In Tom’s Tale, with high Enthu-
siasm, Tom buys the medicine because it involves the merchant.
Assertive Plan Feature
I represent the assertiveness of extroverts in how they include other characters in
their plans whether they want it or not. The Assertive Plan Feature (ASPF) of plan
π for character c is calculated as the number of other non-consenting characters in a
plan.




I(cj ∈ Par(ai)× (1− I(cj ∈ Con(ai)))
A character c is considered to be a non-consenting character in an action a, if
c ∈ Par(a) but c /∈ Con(a). An action may affect a non-consenting character in
a positive or negative way. One may choose to give an item to or attack another
character where, in both cases, that character’s consent is not needed by those actions.
In Tom’s Tale, an assertive Tom would choose to buy the sword and rob the merchant.
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I must note that this action is also affected by Agreeableness. Tom may not choose
this plan if his Agreeableness is high.
Compassion Plan Feature
Highly agreeable individuals prefer actions that assist other characters along the
way. The Cooperative Plan Feature (COPF) of plan π for character c is calculated
as the average intensity of the HappyFor that c expects to be triggered by π.
COPF (c, π, C) =
∑




cj ∈ C − {c}
ai ∈ π
I(I(Happyfor(c, cj, ai)) > 0)
Where, I returns the intensity of the corresponding emotion. In Tom’s Tale, with
high Compassion, Tom buys the sword and medicine from the Merchant.
Politeness Plan Feature
Agreeable individuals show their compassion for other people by avoiding to harm
them in the process. In terms of emotions, a character with high Compassion prefers
plans that minimizes their Gloating.
The Politeness Plan Feature (PPF) of character c for plan π is calculated as the
average intensity of Gloating that c expects to be triggered by π.
PPF (c, π, C) =
∑
cj ∈ C − {c}
ai ∈ π
I(I(Gloating(c, cj, ai)) > 0)
∑
cj ∈ C − {c}
ai ∈ π
I(Gloating(c, cj, ai))
Where, I returns the intensity of the corresponding emotion. In Tom’s Tale, a very
polite Tom would not rob the merchant.
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Stress Relief Feature
Neurotic individuals are prone to anxiety and try to take actions that help to
remove their stressors and feel Relief. The Stress Relief Feature (SRF) of plan π for
character c is calculated as the intensity of Relief that c expects to be triggered at the
end of π. In Tom’s Tale, with high Withdrawal, Tom prefers to buy a sword because
it eliminates the threat of being robbed by the bandit.
Neurotic Behavior Feature
Highly neurotic individuals can be described as indecisive, self-doubting, or impul-
sive. One way to express such characteristics is through showing how often a character
changes their mind and abandons their current plan.
In order to calculate this feature for a slightly to highly neurotic character—scores
of higher than 0.5, I relax the criterion of a valid plan which constrains it to have
no strict subsequences that follow the same criteria. The Neurotic Behavior Feature
(NBF) of plan π for character c is calculated as follows:
NBF (c, π) =

0 pneuroticism(c) < 0.5
Ω(π) pneuroticism(c) > 0.5
Where Ω(π) is the number of strict subsequences of π that are valid plans. For














Now that I have defined and described my 12 features, I will show how a character
chooses between a set of valid plans at any given state. Algorithm 1 returns the best
plan for a character at a state based on their personality. Line 1 shows the inputs
of the algorithm, all valid plans for character c at state s, as well as c’s personality
vector. The personality of the character is specified by five number in [0, 1] for each
of the five factors (0.5 showing neutrality).
For each plan, we calculate the value of the 12 features in Table 4.3 (line 3). We
then calculate the preference vector with five values for each of the big five. Each
value is a function of a personality factor and the features corresponding to that
factor. The character’s preference for a plan is represented by the plan’s utility (Ui)
which is calculated as the Euclidean norm of the preference vector (line 4).
4.4 Intelligent Conflict Generation
“Conflict structures narrative” [Abbott, 2020]. “Drama is conflict” [Field, 2006].
“Story means conflict” [Brooks and Warren, 1979]. There is an agreement among
many that conflict is an essential part of a story [Meehan; Szilas; Barber and Kudenko;
Ware and Young, 1977; 1999; 2007; 2011]. In interactive narratives, conflicts make
the player face difficult choices that may need them to divert from their current plans
and take action to achieve a desired resolution. I use conflict to enable experience
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Algorithm 1 Preference(Π , Pc, c, s)
1: Let Π be the set of valid plans for character c at state s, and Pc be personality
of character c with five values pα, α ∈ {O,C,E,A,N}.
2: for each plan πi ∈ Π do
3: Calculate the set of feature values {fiO1 , fiO2 , fiC1 , fiC2 , ..., fiN1 , fiN2}, repre-
senting two features for each factor as in Table 4.3 for plan πi.
4: Let
Fα = pα ×
fiα1+fiα2
2







managers to guide the story toward specific important choices.
Previous planners have taken measures to ensure a resolution exists when a con-
flict has irreversible consequences. For instance, experience managers may ensure a
resolution exists when the conflict brings the narrative to a dead end, e.g. if an NPC
plans to kill the player, the story does not always end with the player dying. However,
they often make no attempt to create conflicts in an intelligent way.
As an example, The Best Laid Plans, an interactive narrative adventure game,
automatically generates conflicts in real time [Ware and Young, 2015]. However, the
system only tries to find a conflict if one exists and makes no effort to choose conflicts
intelligently to tell the best possible story. We can leverage the ability of strong-story
systems to a much higher extent by distinguishing between different conflicts based
on how they can be resolved. We can not only answer what a conflict is, but how a
conflict is resolved, and how its resolution affects different characters.
I propose to use conflicts in an intelligent and meaningful way by considering a
player model (for player goals and expectations) and player choices that resolve those
conflicts. The experience manager can implicitly encourage author-intended behavior
by creating opportunities for the player to resolve conflicts via that behavior.
Algorithm 2 presents how the experience manager decides about NPC actions for
intelligent conflict generation. The inputs of the function are a plan π, that is non-
deterministically chosen for the NPC, the current state, and the player character
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Algorithm 2 CheckNPCAction(π, s, p)
1: Let π be a plan for an NPC, s is the current state, and p is the player character.
2: if Fear(p, π) then
3: if ∃π′ → Relief(p, α(π′, s)) ∧ Ω(p, π′) then
4: return True
5: return False
(Line 1). It is possible that the player fears that π could decrease their utility (Line
2), represented by Fear(p, π)—player p fears plan π. If so, the experience manager
finds a plan π′ such that it (1) starts from state s, triggers Relief, represented by
Relief(p, α(π′, s))—plan π ending in player p feeling Relief, and (2) is line with the
behavior intended by the author, represented by function Ω(p, π′) (Line 3). For
instance, if the author wants to encourage Agreeableness, Ω(p, π′) return False if π′
includes actions that reduces another character’s utility, or if the author wants to
encourage Extroversion, Ω(p, π′) return True if π′ includes actions that involve other
characters (see Table 4.3). If no such plan exists, then function returns False.
In short, the experience manager ensures that there is always at least one plan that
uses the intended behavior to resolve a conflict. Otherwise, the experience manager




In my previous work, I evaluated the model of belief using multiple human subject
studies. Since the belief model is not the focus of this document, I do not discuss
their design and results. For more information about those experiments, please refer
to Shirvani et al. (2017) and Shirvani et al. (2018).
In this section, I will evaluate the proposed models of personality and emotion
for strong-story narrative planners. I will first investigate the effect of personality,
emotion, and both on the perceived believability of generated (interactive) narra-
tives. I will show that the modeled personality traits can be perceived and recognized
by human readers and the use of personality improves the perceived consistency of
character behaviors. I will also demonstrate that the proposed model of emotion
accurately simulates what characters should feel at certain parts of a short story and
the use of the model enhances player empathy towards story characters, as well as
character believability through the expression of characters’ internal thoughts. Fi-
nally, I will show the readers’ preference over stories that use both personality and
emotion to generate character behavior.
For these (four) experiments, I recruited participants from Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (AMT). I did not target any specific populations and all AMT workers had
an equal opportunity to view and accept the activity. Participants received a small
monetary compensation for accepting the activity, e.g. 10 cents, and a larger amount
for finishing the story and answering the questionnaires, e.g. 1 dollar.
Furthermore, I will present a showcase of the application of personality and emotion
in strong-story planning through intelligent conflict generation. I generated all pos-
sible stories (with a set maximum length) within two interactive narratives. Results
support that using intelligent conflict generation, players will experience a smaller
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number of conflicts in total, but a larger percentage of conflicts that can be resolved
through specified personality traits.
5.2 Emotion
To evaluate the model of emotion, I claim that:
1. The set of stories generated by my model is a superset of stories generated by
narrative planners that do not reason about emotions.
2. The emotions specified by my model are similar to the emotions that human
readers expect characters to experience.
3. Human readers find the character behavior generated by my model more be-
lievable than those created by narrative planners that do not reason about
emotions.
I support my first claim as follows. For all the stories generated by narrative planners
that do not reason about emotions, characters only take actions that contribute to
making them feel Joy, i.e. by increase their utility (see Definition 13). Therefore,
my model can generate all stories that are generated by narrative planners without
emotions. In addition to those stories, there exists a set of stories in which characters
take actions that could make them feel Relief, HappyFor, and Gloating. Since such
actions do not necessarily increase the character’s utility, this set of stories can be
generated by my model but not narrative planners without emotions.
An example story is one where Tom goes to town, buys a sword, goes to the forest
(realizes there are no herbs in the forest), goes back to town, and buys the medicine.
This story can only be generated by my model since “buying a sword” makes Tom feel
Relief. However, narrative planners without emotions do not generate this story since
not only does “buying a sword” not increase Tom’s utility, but actually decreases it.
I empirically evaluate my second and third claims using Experiment 1 and Exper-
iment 2 in the following sections.
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5.2.1 Experiment 1: Character Emotion Validation
In this section, I evaluate how accurately my model operationalizes six basic OCC
emotions, Joy, Distress (Sadness), Hope, Fear, Disappointment, and Relief. I only
considered these six emotions to avoid overwhelming the participant with a large
number of options for each question. I did not include Satisfaction and FearsCon-
firmed since, in this example story, they were always triggered respectively when Joy
and Distress were triggered.
In this experiment, I used the Tom’s Tale story. I first provided a description of
the story domain as follows.
“Tom needs to buy some medicine. The merchant sells medicine in town in
exchange for a coin. Tom has two coins, but he thinks he can make the medicine
himself if he finds some herbs in the forest. At each moment, Tom may feel one of
the following emotions: Relief, Hope, Fear, Joy, Sadness, and Disappointment.”
I then presented the story one action at a time (Table 5.1). Each action was a
translation of the corresponding domain action using simple natural language tem-
plates. After specific sets of actions, I asked what the participant thinks Tom may
feel at that moment (each set of actions is numbered in Table 5.1), and participants
could choose from one of the six emotions. Figure 5.1 presents an example of the
experiment web-page. The emotion determined by the proposed model at each step
is presented in the first column of Table 5.1.
Experiment 1 Results
For Experiment 1, among 70 total participants, only 2 participants chose not to an-
swer all questions and their responses were removed. There were a total of 7 questions
that presented 6 emotions to the participant to choose from. Using Krippendorff’s α
[Krippendorff, 2012], the inter-rater reliability was ' 0.41. I then used the binomial
1There are some Amazon’s Mechanical Turk workers, who may be choosing options randomly as
quick as possible to earn a larger sum of compensation in a shorter amount of time. One reason
that the inter-rater reliability is low is that, in this experiment, I did not use any techniques to
filter out those participants.
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Table 5.1: The Steps and Corresponding Emotions in Experiment 1
Hope 1. Tom forms a plan to go to the forest,
collect herbs, and make the medicine
without spending any of his coins.
Fear 2. Tom thinks it’s possible that the bandit
will find him. in the forest and rob him of
his coins.
3. Tom goes to the town.
Sadness Tom buys a sword from the merchant.
Now, Tom only has one coin.
Relief 4. With the sword, Tom thinks the bandit
won’t try to steal his coins anymore.
5. Tom goes to the forest.
Disappointment Tom looks for herbs but he doesn’t find any.
Tom realizes he can’t make the medicine
himself.
6. Tom goes to the town.
Sadness Tom buys the medicine from the merchant.
Now, Tom doesn’t have any coins anymore.
Joy 7. Nonetheless, Tom needed medicine and
now he has it.
Figure 5.1: An Example of the Experiment 1 Web Page
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exact test [Howell, 2012] to determine the correct answer to each question. If for a
question, the binomial exact test’s p-value (p) is smaller than 0.05, I say that the
participants significantly agree on an answer and consider that as the correct answer.
For 5 questions, the participants agreed on exactly one option (p < 0.05), and for 2
questions, the participants agreed on two options (p < 0.05—for both options). For
those two questions, participants agreed that Tom feels Relief and Sadness when he
spends a coin to buy a sword (sad for losing a coin and relieved for having a sword),
and Tom feels Joy and Relief when he makes it home with the medicine.
To calculate the accuracy of my model, the correct answer to each question was
then compared to how my model answers that question (as presented in Table 5.1.
The accuracy of my model was 100% for the 6 considered emotion and the considered
short story.
5.2.2 Experiment 2: Believability and Empathy in an Interactive Story
To show that the characters generated by my model are more believable, I generated
a short interactive story in which the participant played the role of the main character.
The rules of the story are similar to Tom’s Tale and the player’s goal is to have
medicine. The description presented to each participant at the beginning of the
experiment is as follows.
• You need to buy some medicine. The merchant sells medicine in town in
exchange for a coin and some herbs.
• Fortunately, you have two coins and there are some herbs in the forest. How-
ever, there is a bandit in the forest that may steal your coins if he finds you!
• If the bandit notices someone who has a sword, he will not show himself or try
to rob them.
• The merchant has a sword to sell for one coin and he also will buy it back for
one coin.
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• There are two more villagers in town, Tom and William, and they both want
to buy some bread from the merchant.
• The story is finished when you have medicine and go back to the cottage.
• If you choose to help either Tom or William, remember that you cannot help
them both.
The differences between this interactive story and Tom’s Tale are as follows.
• There are herbs in the forest and the player has to collect them first, give them
to the merchant to make the medicine, and then buy the medicine for one coin.
• The player has the option to buy the sword for one coin and subsequently, sell
it for one coin. It is possible for the player to buy the sword, go to the forest,
come back to town, buy the medicine, sell the sword, and have one coin that
they could give to an NPC.
• I mention the forest bandit to the player, and the player has the option to first
go to town and buy a sword. However, the bandit will never rob the player
regardless of the sword.
The story also included two NPCs (John and William) with only one expressing emo-
tions through text and facial expression. The participant can view both characters’
portraits and thoughts, which may change after certain player actions. At first, the
NPCs state that they want bread, they have an axe, they plan to collect and sell
lumber to buy bread, and that the bandit may rob them in the forest. If the player
chooses to give them a coin (Choice 1), they will now say that they have a coin and
that they can buy bread (the emotional character expresses their joy and satisfac-
tion). If the player chooses to buy a sword and give them the sword (Choice 2), they
state that the bandit cannot rob them anymore (the emotional character expresses
relief). After the player comes back from the forest, if the player had not given them
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anything, both NPCs state that the bandit stole their axe and they can no longer
collect lumber and buy bread. The player will again have the choice of giving them
a coin at this point (Choice 3).
Figure 5.2 presents an example of these two characters. At different steps, the
emotional character can express Happy, Sad, or Scared facial expressions (Figure
5.3), and express their thoughts using emotion keywords, e.g. hope, fear, and so on.
For different participants, the emotional character is randomly chosen to be John or
William, or to be shown on the left or the right. The player has several opportunities
to help either character or neither of them, e.g. they could give them a sword or a
coin. I hypothesized that the expressions of the emotional character would cause the
player to feel empathy and thus, help that character.
The player’s goal is to buy the medicine and go back to the cottage. After satisfying
this goal, I asked them a series of questions about the NPCs, for instance, whether
they found each character to be not at all believable, somewhat believable, or very
believable.
Experiment 2 Results
For Experiment 2, among 70 participants, 15 did not finish the experiment and
their incomplete data was discarded. Using the binomial exact test and Bonferroni
correction for testing multiple hypotheses [Holm, 1979], the following results were
obtained for the rest of the participants.
• The players chose to buy a sword before going to the forest (34 out of 55—
p < 0.03). This supports my hypothesis that characters may take actions that
make them feel Relief even at the cost of their utility.
• The players chose to help the emotional character2 (27 out of 55 —p < 0.01) by
giving them one of their coins. This supports my model that characters may
2They had the option to help either character or help neither. Success is defined as choosing to
help the emotional character out of the 3 total options they had.
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Figure 5.2: An Example of the Interface in Experiment 2
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Figure 5.3: Character Expressions in Experiment 2
take actions that make them feel HappyFor even at the cost of their utility. The
players also stated that they would have helped both characters if they could (45
out of 55—p < 0.01). This shows that characters generated by my model make
players feel empathy towards them and significantly more so than the character
without emotions. Moreover, these results also supports that characters may
take actions that make them feel HappyFor even at the cost of their utility.
• The players agreed that the emotions and reactions of the emotional character
were somewhat to very believable (51 out of 55—p < 0.01) and more so than
the character that expressed no emotions (35 out of 55—p < 0.03) 3. These
results support my hypothesis that my model of emotion can improve character
believability compared to narrative planners that do not reason about emotions.
5.3 Personality
For the stories generated by my model of personality, I claim that:
• Human readers can perceive that a character’s behavior in a story is demon-
strating certain personality traits, and
3The latter refers to when players chose very believable for the emotional character and somewhat
believable or not at all believable for the other character, or chose somewhat believable for the
emotional character and not at all believable for the other.
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In a land far away, Tom is very sick with the flu. The nearby
town has an alchemist, who has a recipe for healing potions.
She makes a bottle from a batch of medicinal herbs and sells
them for a silver coin. But she is all out of healing potions and
medicinal herbs! Luckily, all Tom has is only a silver coin and
there is also only a single batch of herbs in the cottage. The
alchemist is sound asleep, feeling safe because of the town
guard patrolling the streets, arresting anyone who dares to
steal.
Figure 5.4: The Description of the Story in Experiment 3
• They can also recognize other stories in which the character is exhibiting the
same personality traits.
I will test my above hypotheses in Experiment 3.
5.3.1 Experiment 3: Character Personality Perception and Recognition
I conducted Experiment 3 to evaluate my model of personality. In the first stage,
for each participant, Tom’s personality was chosen randomly to reflect high or low
scores of a specific factor. More specifically, it was selected from the 10 possible
options: one where Tom has high Openness, one where he has low Openness, one
where he is highly Conscientious, etc. For each option, Tom has either a high score
(1) or low score (0) for one factor and average values (0.5) for the other four.
Subjects first read a brief description of the domain (Figure 5.4). I then prompted
the participants that Tom is considering four different plans to achieve his goals, and
showed four different stories that could unfold based on those plans. The plans were
different from the stories that unfolded as a result of executing those plans. For
instance, Tom could get arrested at the end of a story, but he wouldn’t plan for that
to happen. After reading these four possible stories, I narrated which one actually
happened, which demonstrates Tom’s personality through his choice.
Subjects then responded to statements about Tom’s personality using a 5 point
Likert scale. The following presents the statements and which FFM inventory they
were adapted from. I only asked the statements that corresponded to the selected
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factor out of the 10 possible options.
1. Openness
• Finds creative solutions to problems [DeYoung et al., 2007].
• Tends to analyze possible outcomes of his plans [Hofstee et al., 1992].
• His ideas are ordinary and hardly unique [Hofstee et al., 1992].
• Has difficulty coming up with excellent plans (that rarely fail) [Goldberg,
1992].
2. Conscientiousness
• Gets things done quickly [DeYoung et al., 2007].
• Wastes his time [DeYoung et al., 2007].
• Makes plans and sticks to them [DeYoung et al., 2007].
• Does just enough work to get by and rather relies on others [Costa and
MacCrae, 1992].
• He wants everything to be just right so he prefers to do things himself
[DeYoung et al., 2007].
3. Extroversion
• Keeps others at a distance [DeYoung et al., 2007].
• Finds it difficult to approach others [DeYoung et al., 2007].
• Feels comfortable around people [Costa and MacCrae, 1992].
• Takes charge [DeYoung et al., 2007]
• Has an assertive personality [DeYoung et al., 2007].
4. Agreeableness
• Takes advantage of others [DeYoung et al., 2007].
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• Avoids conflict [DeYoung et al., 2007].
• Is out for his own personal gain [DeYoung et al., 2007].
• Likes to do things for others [DeYoung et al., 2007].
• Can’t be bothered with other’s needs [DeYoung et al., 2007].
5. Neuroticism
• Is filled with doubts about things [DeYoung et al., 2007].
• Is NOT easily discouraged [DeYoung et al., 2007].
• Rarely changes his mood [DeYoung et al., 2007].
• Does not know why he does some of the things he does [Hofstee et al.,
1992].
• Does things that he later regrets [Hofstee et al., 1992].
Since I only use existing planning features to simulate a simplified version of the Big
Five, I selected the markers that best captured my simulated traits. For instance, I
excluded markers such as “Feel comfortable with myself”, “Rarely feel depressed”,
“Keep things tidy”, “Laugh a lot”, “Avoid philosophical discussions”, or “Get deeply
immersed in music”. Such markers could not be conveyed through external actions
or their inclusion came at the cost of increasing author burden.
In the second stage, subjects were shown four new stories and asked which one
they thought would happen for Tom. These four stories were all different from the
previous four. They included one that reflected a plan with high preference value for
Tom, one with low preference value, the first story generated by the Glaive narrative
planner (which does not reason about personality) [Ware and Young, 2014], and a
randomly chosen story that was not a duplicate. Appendix 2 presents a complete run
of Experiment 3.
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5.3.2 Experiment 3 Results
I generated 26 stories and collected results for 228 subjects. At least 40 subjects
evaluated each factor (at least 20 for the high Openness, at at least 20 for low Open-
ness, etc.). All stories were the same for the participants viewing the same condition
except for the random story in the second stage.
I claim that human readers can perceive that a character’s behavior in a story is
demonstrating certain personality traits. To support this claim, in the first stage of
the experiment, I defined success as subjects reporting agree or strongly agree if the
statement is positively correlated (or disagree or strongly disagree if it was negatively
correlated) with Tom’s score for the corresponding factor. I used a binomial exact
test to detect if I observed more successes than I should expect to see by chance.
The p-value and effect size (expressed as relative risk) for each factor are given in
Table 5.2. I rejected the null hypothesis at the p < 0.05 level for 3 factors, and at the
p < 0.1 level for the other two.
I also claim that human readers can recognize other stories in which the character
is exhibiting the same personality traits. To support this claim, I show that in the
second stage of the experiment, subjects chose a story for Tom that best expressed
his personality according to my model. I defined success as a participant choosing
the best matching story out of the four presented. The p-value and effect size for a
binomial exact test for each factor are given in Table 5.2. I rejected the null hypothesis
at the p < 0.05 level for all factors.
Though many tests were significant, effect sizes were relatively low. Again, I at-
tribute some of this to the high noise collected from Mechanical Turk data.
5.4 Emotion and Personality Combined
I claim that incorporating my models of personality and emotions into narrative
planning results in generating more believable behaviors. I conducted Experiment
4 to support this claim. I used the Tom’s Tale domain in Experiment 4. However,
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Table 5.2: Experiment 3 Results





O 0.072 1.160 0.026 1.60
C 0.016 1.160 0.001 1.73
E 0.024 1.167 0.014 1.61
A 0.048 1.167 ≺0.001 2.80
N 0.063 1.128 0.002 2.04
to evaluate personality, I needed to create two different situations (here referred to
as acts), so that Tom’s decisions in those two acts could be used to portray his
personality. I extended the story to require Tom to go home after acquiring the
medicine. He could go through the forest, which is the shorter but the riskier path.
He also could pay the town guard a coin as a toll so that he would lower the bridge
for Tom to go home.
5.4.1 Experiment 4: Evaluating the Space of All Stories
Based on the inclusion of personality or emotion in narrative planning, the space of
all possible stories divides into four different sets. Figure 5.5 presents a Venn diagram
for these four sets. In Experiment 4, I generated all the stories of the Tom’s Tale
domain for all four sets of stories:
1. PN: Stories that only model personality. For a story to model personality, Tom’s
actions must be consistent over the two acts (first acquiring the medicine, and
then going home) based on my personality model. More specifically, if there is
at least one factor where Tom’s actions reflect a high score for that factor in
one act and a low score in the other that story is considered to lack a model of
personality.
2. NE: Stories that only model emotion. For this set of stories, I added emotion
keywords in the natural language templates that described the story. For in-
stance, instead of “Tom plans to buy the medicine”, I say “Tom hopes to buy
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Figure 5.5: Four Different Sets of Possible Stories with Emotion or Personality
the medicine”. I also added extra sentences wherever necessary, e.g. to convey
that Tom feels disappointment.
3. PE: Stories that model both emotion and personality. In these stories, I both
use emotional descriptions and ensure Tom’s actions are consistent over the two
acts.
4. NN: Stories that model neither personality nor emotion.
There is a noticeable difference between stories with emotions and stories with
personality. Although emotions affect character behaviors, e.g. taking actions to
feel relief, they can also be used as external expressions, for instance, in the context
of my experiment, as emotion keywords. This explicitly prompts the participant
about the difference between stories with and without emotions. However, I only
express personality externally through behavior, actions in narrative planning, and
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Table 5.3: Experiment 4 Questionnaire Presented After Each Story
Questions
1 Tom feels like a realistic lifelike character.
2 Tom has a unique personality based on his actions.
3 The story provides good descriptions of Tom’s internal thoughts.
4 Tom’s actions in act 1 were inconsistent to his actions in act 2.
Table 5.4: Experiment 4 Questionnaire Presented After Both Stories
Questions
1 Choose the story that Tom’s actions were consistent in both acts.
2 Choose the story that makes Tom feel more human like.
3 Choose the story that you found more realistic.
4 Choose the story that you personally prefer to read.
not visually or in the text. Participants would only implicitly perceive a difference
between the stories with and without personality, and they would need to do so over
the two acts.
Experiment Design
After showing a description of the domain (similar to Section 3.1.1), I randomly
chose two stories from two different story sets. Participants first viewed the first act
of each story followed by its second act and then a series of questions about that
story (Table 5.3). After participants read both stories, I then asked another set of
questions that asked them to choose between the two stories (Table 5.4).
Table 5.3 presents the 5-point Likert4 questions that were presented to the player
after reading each story. Table 5.4 presents the comparison questions (choosing be-
tween story 1 and story 2) that were presented to the player after reading both stories.
Experiment 4 Results
The first question for analysis was whether participants responded as predicted to
the dependent variables, existence of personality or existence of emotion. To test
this, participants responded to prompts related to these variables with a 5-point
4Possible answers are Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree.
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Likert questions from strongly disagree to strongly agree.
Likert-type ratings are of ordinal but not interval measurement—that is, the dif-
ference between disagree and neutral is not necessarily the same as the difference
between agree and strongly agree. To better assess the ordinal differences between
questions, I used a cumulative link model (CLM). Sometimes known as ordinal re-
gression, CLMs are a special case of logistic regression which assume that values are
ordinal, with the added benefit of testing for interactions between multiple variables.
The interaction between variables indicates whether their effect is additive or not.
We generally hope to see no interaction between independent variables.
For each question, I additionally conducted pairwise Wilcoxon sum-rank tests to
compare responses to each combination of conditions, using the Benjamini-Hochberg
method of false discovery rate correction [Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995].
• Participants who read stories with emotion gave higher Likert ratings to the
prompt “The story provides good descriptions of Tom’s internal thoughts”
(z = 5.370, p < 0.001). This was not true of stories with personality (z = .447,
p = 0.655), and there was no interaction effect (z = −1.359, p = .174). Pair-
wise Wilcoxon tests indicated that all conditions with emotion had significantly
higher ratings than conditions without emotion (p < 0.001), with no significant
differences with or without personality.
• Similarly, participants who read stories with personality gave lower ratings to
the prompt “Tom’s actions in act 1 were inconsistent to his actions in act 2.”
(z = 5.834, p < 0.001), with no effect of emotion (z = 1.239, p = 0.215) or
interaction (z = −1.188, p = .235). Pairwise Wilcoxon tests indicated that
all conditions with personality had significantly higher ratings than conditions
without personality (p < 0.001), with no significant differences with or without
emotion.
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• Two additional prompts (“Tom feels like a realistic lifelike character” and “Tom
has a unique personality based on his actions”) had no significant differences
by condition (all conditions and interactions |z| < 1.185, p > 0.234).
Table 5.5 compares the effect of dependent variables, personality, emotion, and both
against having neither features. The effects for having both personality and emo-
tion were not significant. This means that there is no effect where having both is
significantly different than expected from the added effect of either independently.
Table 5.6 further supports the significance of difference between different of pairs
of conditions (each value corresponds to the significance of difference between the
condition in the corresponding row and the corresponding column). Since these tests
compare all conditions, the results also show the significance of difference between
having both personality and emotion over having either independently.
• For “The story provides good descriptions of Tom’s internal thoughts”, having
emotion and personality is significantly preferred over having only personality
or having neither.
• For “Tom’s actions in act 1 were inconsistent to his actions in act 2”, having
emotion and personality is significantly preferred over having only emotion or
having neither.
In sum, these results confirm that the personality and emotion conditions success-
fully influenced participant’s interpretation of the character’s consistency of behavior
and emotional states, respectively. Since there were no interactions, personality and
emotion contribute to preference additively and (seemingly) independently.
The second question for analysis was whether users prefer stories that have either
personality, emotion, or both, versus stories without those features. To conduct this
analysis, participants were simply asked which story they preferred on a variety of
dimensions. As participants saw only two stories of the four potential conditions, and
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Table 5.5: CLM Results (p-values) in Experiment 4
Question Emotion Personality Both
Tom feels like a realistic
lifelike character
0.252 0.422 0.532
Tom has a unique
personality based on his
actions
0.590 0.468 0.236




Tom’s actions in act 1 were
inconsistent to his actions
in act 2
<0.001 0.215 0.235
Table 5.6: Wilcoxon Sum-Rank Tests (p-values) in Experiment 4
(a) Tom feels like a realistic
lifelike character
NE NN PE
NN 0.85 - -
PE 0.85 0.85 -
PN 0.85 0.85 0.96
(b) Tom has a unique person-
ality based on his actions
NE NN PE
NN 0.50 - -
PE 0.11 0.39 -
PN 0.39 0.63 0.50
(c) The story provides good descriptions of
Tom’s internal thoughts
NE NN PE
NN <0.001 - -
PE 0.221 <0.001 -
PN <0.001 0.766 <0.001
(d) Tom’s actions in act 1 were incon-
sistent to his actions in act 2
NE NN PE
NN 0.38 - -
PE <0.001 <0.001 -
PN <0.001 <0.001 0.83
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those stories were in different orders, I used a logistic regression to predict preference
or dislike of a story based on condition (Table 5.7).
For each question, I calculated odds ratios of each condition relative to the no-
personality, no-emotion condition (NN) (Table 5.8). Odds ratio can be thought of
as the odds that an outcome will occur more in the comparison group than in the
reference group. For instance, comparing NN to PE with an odds ratio of 1.50 means
that the preferred story is 1.5 times more likely to be the PE story than the NN story.
• Participants significantly preferred stories with personality features in response
to the prompt “Choose the story that Tom’s actions were consistent in both
acts” (p < 0.001), with the highest Odd ratio for personality and no effect of
emotion (p = 0.229).
• Both personality and emotion contributed to preference in response to the
prompt “Choose the story that makes Tom feel more human like” (p < 0.001)—
with a higher Odds ratio for emotion—and “Choose the story that you found
more realistic.” (p = 0.0117).
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 summarize the results. In sum, these results confirm that partic-
ipants preferred stories with personality and emotion and found Tom more realistic
and human like in those stories. Although, having both was not significantly different
than the added effect of either independently, results show the highest Odds ratio for
having both personality and emotion.
5.5 Conflict Generation
In this section, I will investigate the model’s ability to intelligently generate con-
flicts. In order to do so, I implemented two experiences manager in entertainment
and training contexts. The first experience manager was implemented in conjunction
with my open-source game engine, Camelot [Samuel et al.; Shirvani and Ware, 2018;
2020], and the second was developed to work with a police-use-of-force virtual reality
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Table 5.7: Linear Regression Results (p-value) in Experiment 4
Personality Emotion Both
Question p p p
Choose the story that Tom’s actions
were consistent in both acts.
<0.001 0.229 0.447
Choose the story that makes Tom feel
more human like.
0.0117 <0.001 0.0942
Choose the story that you found more
realistic.
0.0253 0.0252 0.861
Choose the story that you personally
prefer to read.
0.288 0.005 0.957
Table 5.8: Linear Regression Results (Odd’s Ratio) in Experiment 4
Personality Emotion Both
Question /174 OR /191 Odds Ratio /200 OR
Choose the story that
Tom’s actions were
consistent in both acts.
111 3.716 73 1.304777 129 3.8320
Choose the story that
makes Tom feel more
human like.
78 1.760 114 3.207792 122 3.388
Choose the story that you
found more realistic.
87 1.630 95 1.613782 121 2.497
Choose the story that you
personally prefer to read.




As an entertainment application, I generated the interactive narrative using the
following domain:
Tom is sick and he needs medicine. He also has two coins. In order to acquire the
medicine, he needs to go to the forest and collect medicinal herbs. The herbs can
be brewed in the alchemist’s shop. The merchant brews the medicine and sells it for
two coins. Tom can also brew the medicine himself in the shop but the merchant
would not give permission to do so. There is also a bandit living in the cottage near
the forest. The bandit sometimes enters the forest and robs anyone in his path. The
merchant also sells a sword for one coin, and the bandit would not try to rob one who
is armed.
Experiment Design
The experience manager also receives the following input functions in addition to
the story domain:
• The author’s utility function: a single complete story ends in increasing this
utility function. The author’s utility function in Experiment 5 increases if the
player acquires the medicine or dies. The author can specify different values for
different outcomes of the story and then use those values for explicit encour-
agement. For instance, if the author’s utility reaches 2, the author may choose





at(Medicine) = Player → 2
〉
• The player utility function: this utility function assumes what the player’s goals





at(Coin1) = Player ∧ at(Medicine) = Player → 5
at(Medicine) = Player → 4
at(Coin1) = Player ∧ at(Coin2) = Player)→ 2
at(Coin1) = Player → 1
at(Coin2) = Player → 1
〉
• The author’s intended behavior function: this function checks whether a plan
exhibits the behavior that is intended by the author. In Experiment 5, I assume
that the author intends to encourage the player to demonstrate certain person-
ality traits. The author’s intended behavior function is determined based on
the preference value calculated in 4.3.3.
A player agent was simulated to play the role of the player. Two different player agents
were simulated in different iterations of the experiment with the following criteria:
(1) an agent with the same utility function as the player utility function and (2) an
agent that acted randomly. To record the number of conflicts, the random agent also
has the same utility function as the player utility function, but when acting, chooses
randomly between all possible actions (even those not explained).
I also used two different author intended behavior functions where the author aimed
to encourage the player to be (1) conscientious, and (2) agreeable.
Conflicts













The player expects to feel Relief after executing the latter plan. The experience
manager considers this plan before executing Go(Bandit, Cottage, Camp). This plan
meets the constraints for Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, and thus, the experi-




To brew the medicine, one must first fire up the cauldron. If the player attempts to
do so, the merchant becomes angry and draws her sword. By observing this action,
the player anticipates a conflict. This conflict can be resolved as follows:
〈Brew(Player,Medicine),
Attack(Merchant, P layer)〉




or (the third plan:)
〈Attack(Player,Merchant)〉
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The player expects to feel Relief by executing the second or third plans. The second
plan is not possible if the player does not have enough coins to buy the medicine. The
third plan is not possible if the player does not have a sword (the merchant refuses
to sell him a sword when she is angry).
Before executing Draw(Merchant, Sword), the experience manager considers the
second and third plans above based on the intended behavior function:
• Only the third plan meets the Conscientiousness constraints (the second plan
has two actions that rely on other characters). The merchant would not draw
her sword if the player does not have a sword.
• Only the second plan meets the Agreeableness constraints (the third plan re-
duces the merchant’s utility). The merchant would not draw her sword if the
player does not have enough coins to buy the medicine.
5.5.2 Experiment 5 Results
I generated all stories with maximum length of 12 steps for the story domain
described earlier in the section. There were a total of 43,291 stories generated. I then
categorized this set of stories based on the following criteria:
• Whether the player agent acted randomly or based on the player utility function
(Random vs. Utility). For Utility, the player agent only chose actions that either
made them feel Joy or Relief. For Random, the player agent could choose actions
with no limitations, i.e. even actions that were not explained.
• Whether the author’s intended behavior was Agreeableness or Conscientiousness
(IBA vs. IBC). For IBA, the author encourages any behavior that did not harm
NPCs (though the Attack action). For IBC, the author encourages plans that
are efficient and self-reliant, e.g. the following plan to resolve a conflict with





• I defined three categories of stories based on whether they accounted for conflicts
that can or cannot be resolved using the intended behavior:
1. Intelligent: The set of stories in which all stories did not present a conflict
to the player if they could not resolve it using the intended behavior.
2. Opposite: The set of stories in which all stories did present a conflict to
the player that they could not resolve using the intended behavior5.
3. Total: The total set of stories for that type of agent (Random or Utility),
i.e. Intelligent ∪Opposite.
For each categories of stories, I measured the following information:
• The number of stories (Stories): the number of stories that match the criteria
of that category.
• The number of times the player agent anticipated a conflict based on the player
utility function (Conflicts): There were two instances that the story presented
a conflict to the player. The bandit enters the forest when the player is in the
forest, and the merchant draws their sword and approaches the player. Each
story may include 0, 1, or 2 conflicts.
• The number of times the conflict could not be resolved using the author’s in-
tended behavior (NRes): If any of the above conflicts were presented and the
player did not have the option to resolve them using the intended behavior.
The goal is to reduce this number as much as possible.
5I must note that I do not intentionally generate this type of story. The Opposite set refers to the
stories among the set of all generated stories that match the stated criterion.
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• The number of times the agent felt FearsConfirmed after the resolution of a
conflict (FearsConfirmed): If the bandit robs the player agent or the merchant
kills them.
• The number of times the agent felt Relief after the resolution of a conflict
(Relief): If the player observes the bandit in the forest, they could go and
buy a sword, and if they observe the merchant is threatening them, they could
either attack them with the sword or give them the herbs to let them make the
medicine. These two options are not always available to the player at the same
time.
• The percentage of conflicts, on average, that the player could not resolve using
the intended behavior (AVGRes): Among all instances of the conflicts presented
to the player, what percentage of those conflicts could not have been resolved
by agreeable or conscientious behavior? Similar to NRes, we aim to reduce this
number as much as possible.
• The percentage of conflicts, on average, that the player resolved using the in-
tended behavior (Intended Resolutions): If the player was presented with a
conflict, on average, what percentage of times they resolved that conflict using
agreeable or conscientious behavior? I hypothesized to see a higher value for
Intended Resolutions as a result of implicit encouragement.
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 present the results. Among 43,291 stories, there were 100 stories
in which all player agent actions were explained. When using intelligent conflict
generation, a smaller number of conflicts are presented to the player. This is due to
the fact that for all conflicts, the player cannot always resolve them using intended
behavior.
In the context of this experiment, I define success as a smaller NRes, a smaller
AVGRes, or a larger Intended Resolutions. Other measures, i.e. Conflicts, FearsCon-
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Table 5.9: Experiment 5 Results
Categories Stories Conflicts NRes FearsConfirmed Relief
IBA
Random
Intelligent 32,790 0.410 0 0.036 0295
Opposite 10,400 1.435 1 0.401 0.423
Utility
Intelligent 48 1.229 0 0.250 0.500
Opposite 52 1.884 1 0.557 0.961
IBC
Random
Intelligent 37,064 0.523 0 0.524 0.352
Opposite 6,126 1.464 1 0.557 0.169
Utility
Intelligent 72 1.458 0 0.291 0.916
Opposite 28 1.857 1 0.714 0.285
firmed, and Relief, provide some ground to make more meaningful comparisons, but
do not directly indicate an improvement.
Without intelligent conflict generation, there are more conflicts that cannot be
resolved using the intended behavior. When the intended behavior function was
Agreeableness, the player could not resolve a conflict using the intended behavior
in 10,452 stories (34.87% of the time). When the intended behavior function was
Conscientiousness, the player could not resolve a conflict using the intended behavior
in 6,154 stories (19.7% of the time).
For all conflicts in the stories, the player could either (1) ignore the conflict, (2)
resolve the conflict using the intended behavior, or (3) resolve the conflict using any
other type of behavior. Column AVGRes in Table 5.10 presents the percentage of
the conflicts that were resolved by the player using the intended behavior. As shown,
when using intelligent conflict generation, on average, the player agent was more likely
to resolve a conflict using the intended behavior.
5.5.3 Experiment 6
In this experiment, I used the following domain to generate an interactive story
for a police-use-of-force training simulation, named Traffic Stop. The Traffic Stop
virtual reality training simulation is an ongoing project funded by National Science
Foundation in partnership with the University of Kentucky Police Department. The
following scenario is based on an actual de-escalation training role-play exercise used
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Table 5.10: Experiment 5 Results (Continued)















by UKPD, which is designed based on real events.
A police officer stops a speeding car. The police officer contacts dispatch to check
the plates. They realize that the owner of the plates has filed a restraining order that
may or may not be against the passenger. The police officer can then ask the passenger
for their driver’s license. After checking the driver’s license, if the passenger is indeed
the person stated in the restraining order, the police officer asks the passenger to
leave the car and proceeds to handcuff them. Otherwise, the police officer writes a
citation and lets the driver go.
The passenger has a gun that the police officer is not aware of. If the passenger
draws their gun, the police officer realizes that they or the driver are in immediate
danger and that they have no other option but to shoot the passenger. It is also
possible that the passenger expresses their anger and frustration when the officer
asks them to do something, i.e. hand over their driver’s license or leave the car. If
the officer senses the passenger’s frustration, they may choose to explain the situation
in order to calm them down and avoid potentially endangering the passenger.
Experiment Design
The experience manager also receives the following input functions:
• The author’s utility function: a single complete story ends in increasing this
utility function. The author’s utility function in Experiment 6 increases if the
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• The player utility function: this utility function assumes what the player’s goals
are in the narrative. The player utility function in Experiment 6 is as follows.
The player want to keep themselves and the driver alive, arrest the passenger if





restraining(Passenger) ∧ arrested(Passenger)→ 1
¬restraining(Passenger) ∧ cited(Driver)→ 1
〉
• The author’s intended behavior function: this function checks whether a plan
exhibits the behavior that is intended by the author. In Experiment 6, I assume
that the author intends to encourage the player to demonstrate certain person-
ality traits. The author’s intended behavior function is determined based on
the preference value calculated in 4.3.3. In Experiment 6, the author intends to
encourage Agreeableness.
Similar to Experiment 5, two different player agents were simulated in different it-
erations of the experiment with the following criteria: (1) an agent with the same
utility function as the player utility function and (2) an agent that acted randomly.
To record the number of conflicts, the random agent also has the same utility function
as the player utility function, but when acting, chooses randomly between all possible
actions (even those not explained).
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Conflicts
Some examples of conflicts in this story domain are as follows:
First possible conflict:
〈Draw(Passenger,Gun)〉
When the passenger draws their gun, the player anticipates a conflict. The conflict







The player expects to feel Relief after executing the last plan. The experience
manager considers this plan before executing Draw(Passenger,Gun). As this plan
does not meet the constraints for Agreeableness, the experience manager would not





〈AskFor(Player, Passenger, Leave Car),
Angry(Passenger)〉
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If the player asks the passenger to do something, e.g. hand over their driver’s
license, they may express their anger and frustration, e.g. because they were not
driving at the time. If the passenger becomes angry, it is possible that they would
harm the driver. By observing this action, the player anticipates a conflict. This
conflict can be resolved as follows:
(the first plan:)
〈Harm(Passenger,Driver)〉
or (the second plan:)
〈Explain(Player, Passenger)〉
or (the third plan:)
〈Draw(Player,Gun),
Shoot(Player, Passenger)〉
The player expects to feel Relief by executing the second or third plans. The
experience manager considers the second and third plans above before executing
Draw(Merchant, Sword). Only the second plan meets the requirements for Agree-
ableness.
5.5.4 Experiment 6 Results
I generated all stories with maximum length of 10 steps for the story domain
described earlier in the section. There were a total of 400,535 stories generated. I
then categorized this set of stories based on the following criteria. These criteria are
the same as described in the previous section.
• Whether the player agent acted randomly or based on the player utility function
(Random vs. Utility).
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• Whether the story presents conflicts that the player can resolve using the in-
tended behavior (Intelligent), or the player cannot resolve using the intended
behavior (Opposite), or the player may or may not be able to resolve using the
intended behavior (Total).
For each categories of stories, I measured the following information. These measures
are the same as described in the previous section.
• The number of stories (Stories)
• The number of times the player agent anticipated a conflict based on the player
utility function (Conflict): There were two instances that the story presented
a conflict to the player: (1) the passenger expresses their anger, and (2) the
passenger draws their gun. Each story may include 0, 1, or 2 conflicts.
• The number of times the conflict could not be resolved using the author’s in-
tended behavior (NRes): If the passenger draws their gun.
• The number of times the agent felt FearsConfirmed after the resolution of a
conflict (FearsConfirmed): If the passenger harms the driver, shoots the driver,
or shoots the player6.
• The number of times the agent felt Relief after the resolution of a conflict
(Relief): If the player shoots the passenger or explains the situation to them
depending on the corresponding conflict.
• The percentage of conflicts, on average, that the player could not resolve a
conflict using the intended behavior (AVGRes).
• The percentage of conflicts, on average, that the player resolved a conflict using
the intended behavior (Intended Resolution).
6For the purposes of this experiment, I distinguish between harming and shooting the driver, since
the player does not originally believe that the passenger has a gun.
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Table 5.11: Experiment 6 Results
Stories Conflicts NRes FearsConfirmed Relief
Random
Intelligent 178,711 0.923 0 0.251 0.785
Opposite 209,046 1.821 1 0.573 0.907
Utility
Intelligent 2,876 0.976 0 0.714 0.945
Opposite 9,901 1.913 1 0.981 0.965
Table 5.12: Experiment 6 Results (Continued)
Stories AVGRes(%) Intended Resolution(%)
Random
Intelligent 178,711 0 71.51
Total 387,757 38.30 38.71
Utility
Intelligent 2,876 0 63.19
Total 12,777 45.51 31.58
Tables 5.11 and 5.12 present the results. Among 400,534 stories, there were 12,777
stories in which all player agent actions were explained. When using intelligent conflict
generation, a smaller number of conflicts are presented to the player. This is due to
the fact that for all conflicts, the player cannot always resolve them using intended
behavior.
Without intelligent conflict generation, there is a higher number of conflicts that
cannot be resolved using the intended behavior. There were 218,948 stories (Opposite)
in which the player could not resolve a conflict using agreeable behavior. In fact, on
average, 45.51% of the conflicts in all stories (Total) could not be resolved using
agreeable behavior.
Column AVGRes in Table 5.12 presents the percentage of the conflicts that were
resolved by the player using the intended behavior. As shown, when using intelligent
conflict generation, on average, the player agent was more likely to resolve a conflict
using the intended behavior.
5.5.5 Discussion
I considered all possible stories (with a length restriction) for two story domains.
These stories included ones where the system chose to present or not present a conflict
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to the player. With intelligent conflict generation (Intelligent), the system chooses
conflicts intelligently based on the author’s intended experience for the player. The
Intelligent experience manager avoids “bad” conflicts that cannot be resolved in the
intended way, hence, reducing NRes to 0, and, overall, presenting a smaller number
of conflicts.
These stories also includes ones where after the conflict was presented, the player
chose to take action and feel Relief or continue with their previous plan. If the
player chose to continue with their previous plan, the system non-deterministically
chose to do nothing or resolve the conflict, making the player feel FearsConfirmed.
For instance, in some stories, the bandit faces the player but does not rob them
afterwards. It is possible to have the system always resolve the conflict, but in doing
so, it would force the player to choose one of their options to resolve the conflict
themselves.
Among the stories where the player felt Relief, their actions were either in line
with or against the intended behavior. Using the Intelligent experience manager, all
conflicts could always be resolved using the intended behavior. Therefore, on average,
the player was more likely to demonstrate the intended behavior when resolving a
conflict.
These results apply whether the player follows the utility function assumed by the
author or chooses to act randomly. Both kinds of players have experiences that are
more in line with the author’s intentions—they were more likely to resolve conflicts
using the intended behavior. In short, both kinds of players have more opportunities
and are more likely to demonstrate the intended behavior thanks to choosing conflicts
intelligently.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Interactive narratives are prevalent in a wide variety of applications that involve
human-computer interaction. These application range from educational and training
simulations that intend to guide the player experience in pursuit of certain goals
to entertainment contexts that may only need to be engaging and immersive for
their users. Believable characters are an essential requirement for effective interactive
narratives. They allow users to more willingly suspend their disbelief and have a
more impactful experience.
Previous narrative systems, whether in strong story or strong autonomy, proposed
and developed various models to improve character believability. Those models in-
clude intentionality, belief, emotion, and personality. In my research, I focused on
strong-story narrative planning to study and improve believable behavior generation.
I built upon previous narrative planners that enabled their agents to have goals and
beliefs, and extended them with models of personality and emotion.
My models of personality and emotion are respectively inspired by the Big Five and
OCC, which are two widely validated models in psychology. I drew from the concepts
shared between those models and narrative planning, and adapted those concepts
into their computational counterparts. I investigated my proposed models in human
subject studies that asked subjects to read or play a(n) (interactive) story and answer
a few questions about them. My findings showed that using my proposed models, the
generated behavior was perceived to be more believable by human readers. In some
cases, the virtual characters even caused the player to feel empathy towards them.
There are some limitations to my models of personality and emotion. I intentionally
limited myself to structures that were already present in narrative planning to ensure
a high degree of reusability and add the smallest amount of author burden.
For personality, I focused on traits that were communicated through external ac-
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tions and disregarded traits that were domain-specific. In short, I chose to oversim-
plify rather than overlook. Further modifications to narrative planning structures can
enable adapting more personality traits and provide a deeper computational model
of personality.
For emotion, I only adapted 12 out of 22 emotion types. Although it is possible to
extend my model to include the rest, it is necessary to define a model of social context
that reasons about character standards. Those emotions specifically address how an
action might be praiseworthy or blameworthy in the eyes of different characters.
To demonstrate the power of strong story in generating interactive stories, I used
my models of emotion and personality to intelligently generate conflicts. More specif-
ically, I enabled the author to define a set of behavior patterns that they wanted to
encourage in their users. The system then implicitly encouraged those behaviors by
planning stories in which the player could resolve the presented conflicts using those
behaviors. Using simulated experiments, I showed that through intelligent conflict
generation, we can properly distinguish between different conflicts and by providing
more opportunities for the player, they are more encouraged to demonstrate author-
intended behaviors.
There are a few way that I could improve intelligent conflict generation. First, I
defined conflicts as situations where a character fears that another character could
reduce their utility. It is possible to extend this model to account for situations where
a character expects that another character could make them feel disappointment. For
instance, if the bandit steals the medicine from the merchant, it does not decrease
the player’s utility; however, it makes the player feel disappointment because they
can no longer obtain the medicine. This consideration allows for filtering out more
situations which the player cannot address using the intended behavior.
Second, in its current state, my model can only implicitly encourage the intended
behavior. It means that the system only provides more opportunities for the player
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to exhibit the intended behavior. To explicitly encourage player behavior, the system
must also respond differently when the player resolves a conflict using the intended
behavior or not. For instance, if the player can resolve a conflict by talking to or
shooting a suspect, the system must find two different scenarios to occur based on the
player’s choice. Perhaps, if the player shoots the suspect, the suspect also shoots back
at them, but if they try to talk to the suspect, the suspect surrenders their gun. It is
necessary for the author to provide the system with explicit ways of encouragement;
but the system should also be capable of searching for and planning those actions.
My proposed models of emotion and personality are designed to be extensible. I
plan to continue my research and expand or exchange certain components of mod-
els. I also hope that for other researchers of the community, these models provide




Camelot is a modular and customizable interactive narrative environment that
provides a sandbox to act as a presentation layer for any narrative generation system.
Camelot is a real-time 3D third-person virtual environment that takes place in a
Medieval fantasy setting and includes customizable characters, places, and items. By
using this environment, researchers can build and test prototypes faster and easier.
By providing a fully separate presentation layer, Camelot is independent of the
programming language or technology used by the narrative generation system. This
separation of concerns lets Camelot provide a standard of presentation that can be
shared among the interactive narrative community. Through this standard, various
AI approaches can be meaningfully compared to one another and evaluated in the
same context and with the same subjects. Moreover, this standard can facilitate
researchers to reproduce and build upon the works of others.
License and Availability
Camelot is published under the Non-Profit Open Source License 3.0. This license
allows Camelot to be used for personal, professional, and academic projects at no
cost. It is only necessary to acknowledge the original project and creators in any
derivative works. You can view a comprehensive interactive documentation website
for Camelot at:
http://cs.uky.edu/˜sgware/projects/camelot/
The documentation provides details on how to use Camelot and its actions, as well
as showcasing its characters, places, items, action icons, visual effects, and sound
effects. You can also download Camelot for Windows or MacOs from the documen-
tation website.
Modular and Customizable
Camelot comes with a set of characters and places that can be customized as
intended. To create various characters, an experience manager can choose from dif-
ferent body-types, hair styles, hair colors, eye colors, skin tones, and outfits. Figure
1 presents some examples of these characters.
As I mentioned, places are the small, contained, pre-built locations that can be
instantiated to create the story world. Figure 2 presents some examples of these
places. Each place comes with a set of interactive furniture, such as shelves, chairs,
tables, or cauldrons, that can be hidden or shown depending on the context of the
story. Camelot does not impose any restrictions on where the doors of each place lead
to. This enables Camelot’s world creation to be modular and allows any configuration
of the space.
Interoperability
To generate an interactive narrative, Camelot communicates with an experience
manager (EM). A Camelot EM can be written in any programming language that has
standard input and output capabilities. In fact, all communications between Camelot
and the EM are transmitted via the standard I/O, e.g. System.out.Println in Java,
115
Figure 1: Some Examples of Camelot Characters
Figure 2: Some Examples of Camelot Places
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print in Python, or Console.WriteLine in C#. Camelot has a large list of available
commands that can be used to control its UI, characters, environments, etc. These






APPENDIX 2: COMPLETE RUN OF EXPERIMENT 3
In the following example, Tom has low Neuroticism. The following description
includes the texts shown to the participant, as well as some details, noted by an
underline, for clarification.
There are various ways Tom could get his hands on a healing potion. Some may
work. Some may not! These are some of the possible stories that could happen.
Story 1
Tom goes to the town.
Tom knocks on the door and the alchemist lets him into the shop.
Tom tells the alchemist about the herbs in the cottage.
The alchemist leaves the shop to collect the herbs.
Tom steals the recipe WITHOUT anyone noticing.
The alchemist collects the herbs.
The alchemist comes back to the shop.
Tom steals the herbs from the alchemist.
Tom makes the medicine using the herbs.
The alchemist calls for the guard.
The guard arrests Tom.
Story 2
Tom collects poisonous herbs from the cottage and makes poison.
Tom collects the medicinal herbs from the cottage.
Tom goes to the town.
Tom breaks into the alchemists shop WITHOUT waking her up to steal the recipe.
Tom changes his mind. Tom poisons the alchemists drink WITHOUT her noticing.
Tom goes to the town. Tom changes his mind.
Tom breaks into the alchemists shop WITHOUT waking her up to steal the recipe.
Tom steals the recipe WITHOUT anyone noticing.
Tom makes the medicine using the herbs.
Story 3
Tom collects the medicinal herbs from the cottage.
Tom goes to the town.
Tom knocks on the door and the alchemist lets him into the shop.
Tom tells the alchemist about the herbs in the cottage.
The alchemist leaves the shop to collect the herbs.
Tom steals the recipe WITHOUT anyone noticing.
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Story 4
Tom collects the medicinal herbs from the cottage.
Tom goes to the town.
Tom knocks on the door and the alchemist lets him into the shop.
Tom gives the herbs to the alchemist to make medicine.
Tom changes his mind.
Tom steals the herbs from the alchemist.
Tom steals the recipe from the alchemist.
Tom makes the medicine using the herbs.
The alchemist calls for the guard.
The guard arrests Tom.
Among all the possible ways to get the medicine, this is what Tom does.
First Story
The first story above is what actually happened. In other words, Tom did not think
of the other ways to get the medicine mentioned above or if he did, he preferred to
do it this way.
Tom’s choice of actions reflects the kind of person he is. To what extent do you
agree the following statements can be used to describe Tom? To answer, compare the
first story (what Tom actually did) with the other stories that could have happened
but did not.
The participants answer the following 5-point Likert questions.
Does not know why he does some of the things he does.
Does things that he later regrets.
Is filled with doubts about things.
Is NOT easily discouraged.
Rarely changes his mood.
Now, consider these other possible events. Based on Tom’s choice and your answers
to last questions, you can imagine what type of person he is. Which of these stories
is most likely to happen given Tom’s personality?
Story 5 (Low Neuroticism)
Tom goes to the town.
Tom knocks on the door and the alchemist lets him into the shop.
Tom tells the alchemist about the herbs in the cottage.
The alchemist leaves the shop to collect the herbs.
The alchemist collects the herbs.
The alchemist comes back to the shop.
The alchemist makes the medicine using the herbs.
Tom steals the medicine from the alchemist.
The alchemist calls for the guard.
The guard arrests Tom.
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Story 6 (High Neuroticism)
Tom collects the medicinal herbs from the cottage.
Tom goes to the town.
Tom knocks on the door and the alchemist lets him into the shop.
Tom tells the alchemist about the herbs in the cottage.
The alchemist leaves the shop to collect the herbs.
Tom changes his mind.
Tom goes to the town.
Tom changes his mind.
Tom breaks into the alchemists shop WITHOUT waking her up.
Tom steals the recipe WITHOUT anyone noticing.
Tom makes the medicine using the herbs.
Story 7 (Genereated by Glaive)
Tom collects the medicinal herbs from the cottage.
Tom goes to the town.
Tom knocks on the door and the alchemist lets him into the shop.
Tom steals the recipe from the alchemist.
Tom makes the medicine using the herbs.
The alchemist calls for the guard.
The guard arrests Tom.
Story 8 (A Random Story)
Tom collects poisonous herbs from the cottage and makes poison.
Tom goes to the town.
Tom knocks on the door and the alchemist lets him into the shop.
Tom tells the alchemist about the herbs in the cottage.
The alchemist leaves the shop to collect the herbs.
Tom poisons the alchemists drink WITHOUT her noticing.
The alchemist collects the herbs.
The alchemist comes back to the shop.
Unknowingly, the alchemist drinks the poison and faints.
Tom steals the recipe from the unconscious alchemist.
Tom steals the herbs from the unconscious alchemist.
Tom makes the medicine using the herbs.
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